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ABSTRACT

Against the Thalassocracy: Sacred Geography, Nationhood and Perennial
Traditionalism in Alexander Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist Philosophy

Jonathan Rushbrook

This thesis discusses the ideological makeup of the Russian right wing philosopher Alexander
Dugin and his conceptualization of race and nation in his Neo-Eurasianist imperial project.
Tracing Dugin’s ideological influences from early Eurasianism, the European New Right and
esoteric religious beliefs such as Perennial Traditionalism, the thesis then goes on to place
Dugin’s body of thought within a larger debate on defining fascism and whether Dugin can be
considered a fascist. Ultimately this thesis contests some scholars’ interpretations of Dugin’s
worldview as a fundamentally ethnocentric or even racist Russian nationalism. Rather, by
examining Dugin’s writings on nation through an ethno-symbolist prism this thesis argues that
Dugin holds a fundamentally religious understanding of reality that sees nations as
manifestations of a spiritual, rather than a biological, essence. Thus it precludes Dugin from
any purely biological racism. Concomitantly, the thesis emphasizes that Dugin’s NeoEurasianist imperial project disqualifies him from any typical fascist taxonomy. Instead, NeoEurasianism represents a genuinely unique strain of extreme right wing thought that, though
shares many similarities with historic fascism, nonetheless cannot be considered fascist due to
Dugin’s profoundly anti-modern vision and the supranational emphasis of his imperial
objectives.
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Introduction
This thesis is an examination of how the Russian radical right, in the age of
globalization and information, constructs national identity in its body of written work. The
extreme right in Russia is certainly not a monolithic political entity. Ideologies are inherently
multi-faceted and sometimes paradoxical. This is a particularly relevant observation when one
researches fringe politics. Compared to mainstream politics, fringe political ideologies exist on
the peripheries of a community's main discursive stage. While mainstream politics work within
a system of accepted political truisms and modes of conduct, such as accepting the legitimacy
of the rule of law and the outcome of elections, fringe thinkers often work to overturn and
replace those accepted norms. Thus, fringe ideologies on the outskirts of typical political
discourse sometimes maintain that the only means of transforming society is through political
extremism. This “low” form of peripheral politics is mirrored by a form of “high” peripheral
politics. Like the “low” type, “high” peripheral politics maintains that the current system must
fundamentally and drastically change. While sometimes participating in a cult of action and
violence, thinkers and ideologues of “high” peripheral politics often maintain that the only way
to affect true systemic change is to alter the dominant culture and worldview of society's elites.
This Gramscian approach is the hallmark of the European Nouvelle Droite, or New Right which
seeks to overthrow the dominant liberal culture of the modern West and replace it with an
Identitarian, often racist, defense of Europe and European culture against what it perceives to
be the civilization-killing effects of American culture. Similar but not

identical to the

ideologues of the Nouvelle Droite, such as Alain de Benoist and Tomislav Sunic is the Russian
Eurasianst Alexander Dugin, whose body of ideas is the major subject of this work.
Alexander Dugin has recently risen in popularity as a notable thinker among the
Russian right. He argues for a “radical centralism” that supports the leadership of Vladimir
1

Putin and calls for the territorial expansion of the Russian Federation.1 He has admitted to being
a follower of Julius Evola, who has himself been described by historians as a fascist apologist
and reactionary. Furthermore, Dugin has openly accepted many of the major tenets of the
European New Right such as the rejection of liberalism, egalitarianism, and multi-culturalism.
Along with Dugin’s calls for the formation of a greatly enlarged Russian, or Eurasian, empire,
he has encouraged the formation of a new European empire, based on “Indo-European, Roman
and Greek values.”2 Over the years his activities and collective body of thought have drawn
the interest of various scholars of fascism, neo-fascism and the broader New Right movement.
Given his known political and philosophical affiliations it has become a recent trend among
historians and political scientists to claim that, like many of his ideological allies, Dugin
harbors racist sympathies or at least a sort of Russian supremacist worldview, despite his own
arguments to the contrary.
The primary research question of this work, then, is how does Alexander Dugin
conceive of nation and how does he define the Russian nation? Furthermore, is Dugin’s
Traditionalism and exhortation to preserve the cultural diversity of the world a façade created
in order to cover up a fundamentally racist set of ideas? Additionally, how do his ideas differ
from historical traditionalists like his personal inspiration, Julius Evola, as well as the broader
intellectual currents present within the European and North American New Right?
The major argument of this study is that, contrary to some scholars who argue that
Dugin is an ethnic Russian nationalist or even a racist, Dugin’s avowed perennial Traditionalist
worldview is genuine and it precludes his thinking from a completely ethnic understanding of
nationalism. Rather, Dugin is a cultural and spiritual nationalist, one who maintains that
nationhood is defined, not by race or ethnicity, but by the cultural and spiritual participation of
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a people in their Traditional faith. Narrating the history of the world and the Russian nation
through a fall-redemption myth-symbol complex, he ultimately defines Russians, and other
peoples, as physical manifestations of sacred or spiritual ideas. For the Russians, their historic
and spiritual destiny is that of a unifier and protector of other particular and smaller peoples.
Nonetheless, despite much of his rhetoric of Neo-Eurasianism, the Russian nation is the most
indispensable nation in Dugin's supranational project.
The Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin's Neo-Eurasianist movement, like
the European New Right, seeks to create a fundamentally new identity in order to combat the
United States and globalization. For the purposes of this project, I will be utilizing the concept
of the “mythomoteur” created by Anthony D. Smith who is himself a determined promoter of
the ethno-symbolist school when it comes to the question of what is a nation and how it is
constituted. A mythomoteur, also known as a constitutive myth, is the major narrative taken up
by a nation or nationalist project. Combined with a nation’s myth-symbol complex it represents
the chief means of deriving meaning for a nation and provides identity to individuals who are
a part of that nation. These myths and symbols, passed down from a community’s priests and
storytellers over generations and even centuries, regardless of their foundation in reality, are
the primary means by which national identities are constituted. Thus, a people must have a
shared connection to a specific mythomoteur in order for a sense of shared nationhood to take
root. Applying a fundamentally ethno-symbolic approach to Alexander Dugin’s NeoEurasianist ideology, I hope to uncover the constitutive myths of the Eurasian mythomoteur
promoted by Dugin.
In a literature review, I will explain in detail the major rifts and gaps within the current
scholarship on Dugin and Neo-Eurasianism. In general there are two general interpretations
among scholars as to Dugin’s avowed Traditionalism and worldview. Some academics such as
Marlene Laruelle connect Dugin’s esoteric writings with the writings of noted Ariosophists

3

such as Guido von List who portrayed Aryan man as a biologically supreme race. Other writers,
like the theologian James Heiser, emphasize the eschatological nature of Dugin’s writings
which are in full agreement with Traditionalism. Still others, such as Andreas Umland maintain
that despite his protestations, Dugin cannot be considered a Traditionalist as his ideas are
largely aberrant from much of what can be considered Guénonian Traditionalism. I argue that
Heiser’s interpretation is closest to reality and that Dugin’s Traditionalist writings are shorn of
the biological racism of Julius Evola’s thought while still maintaining Evola’s religious and
mystical worldview.
Given that this project is a multi-disciplinary endeavor I will be drawing from both
social science and historical sources. In order to ascertain the nature of Dugin's sense of what
does and does not constitute a nation, I will be drawing generally from the literature on theories
of nationalism, but will examine neo-Eurasian nationalism primarily through an ethnosymbolic interpretive prism. Thus that part of the work will outline the broad currents of
thought within the political science and history literature on nationalism.
In the Methodology section I will explain how I appraise Dugin’s mythomoteur. This
will be accomplished through exploring not only his own body of work, but also examining the
work of Traditionalists such as René Guénon (1886 – 1951) and Julius Evola (1898 -1974),
both of whom as Dugin notes have been particularly influential on his worldview. Thirdly, by
examining contemporary racist thinkers in the New Right I hope to elucidate how Dugin has
been seen as a problem to many racist New Rightists today, who have come to view Dugin as
a multiculturalist subversive within right-wing politics. By examining all three broad bodies of
literature I hope to explain how Dugin, while representing fundamentally violent and dangerous
thought, nonetheless perceives the world very differently from real racists, contrary to what
some scholars maintain.
The first chapter of the work provides general background information about Alexander

4

Dugin, the early Eurasianists, who preceded and thus inform much of Dugin’s thought, as well
as the New Right. Here I will discuss the basic tenets of Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory and
his anti-modernism. Furthermore, I will discuss his geopolitical goals for the creation of a
Eurasian empire.
The second chapter discusses the historic origins of the Eurasianist movement during
the Russian Civil War. The early Eurasianists argued for a historiographical interpretation of
Russian history as one that transcended East and West by idealizing Russia’s historical
connections to the Mongolian Empire. Then, the chapter will describe in brief the Cold War era
origins of the European New Right and its expansion into North America.
Thirdly, I will discuss the historical origins of Traditionalism and the ideas of René
Guénon and Julius Evola. It is impossible to understand Dugin’s own worldview without
understanding Traditionalism. Consequently, I will briefly discuss Julius Evola’s interpretation
of biological race and how it is conceivable that Alexander Dugin, given what he has written,
has genuinely discounted race as meaningful in identity and has at most applied Evola’s ideas
of a sort of “spiritual race.” As will be seen, Evola did not believe that race was a purely
inherent biological trait. Rather, Evola conceived of race as a spiritual characteristic of
individuals that could be elevated through station and virtuous living, regardless of ethnicity.
In the fourth chapter, this study will examine what Dugin has said on biological race
and how he approaches identity. While outlining the seemingly racial components of his
worldview and his desire for a violent confrontation with the United States, I will attempt to
place Dugin into the context of a broader internal debate within the New Right, particularly
among members of the North American New Right. This debate centers on how they should
interpret Alexander Dugin’s own body of thought. While there has been no consensus reached,
racist thinkers such as Greg Johnson and Michael O’Meara have been adamant that Dugin is a
subversive element within the New Right movement and his doctrine of multi-polarity and his
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anti-racism make him an enemy, not a friend, of White Nationalism and racist thought.
Ultimately, the novelty and uniqueness of this project derives from two major sources.
By viewing Dugin’s work through an ethno-symbolist interpretive prism we are able to
understand that he conceives of nationhood in both an ethnic and spiritual sense. It is ethnic
insofar as Russian stories, myths, and narratives form the essential myth-symbol complex of a
larger, supranational project – Eurasianism. Yet Traditionalism colors his worldview and thus
Russians are not just given substance by their shared myths and symbols, but by their messianic
spiritual mission. Secondly, by discussing the recent debates within the New Right on Dugin,
we bring to bear circumstantial, but no less important, evidence that Dugin’s views, despite
what some scholars might indicate, are fundamentally not racist.

6

Methodology and Sources

This work was completed for an interdisciplinary purpose. Accordingly it relies on a
broad collection of scholarship, both in history and social science. In order to articulate an
argument on national identity, this study has drawn from a large pool of secondary references
and analytical sources on the various theories of national identity formation and nationalism.
Furthermore, in order to engage in the current scholarly debate over Alexander Dugin’s
fundamental worldview, I also draw on secondary sources that deal with Neo-Eurasianism and
its intellectual and ideological ancestors.
This work is largely an examination of a thinker’s body of thought, and in order to
ascertain the major components of Neo-Eurasianisms myth-symbol complex, it is important to
examine much of Alexander Dugin’s writings in order to determine how he conceives of nation.
Thus, in order to measure Alexander Dugin’s proposed mythomoteur this work relies on
primary sources including much of Dugin’s own work. This comprises Dugin’s attempts at
theorizing what he calls the “Fourth Political Theory,” his work on geopolitics as well as his
more esoteric and mystical reflections. Other primary sources include the writings of
Traditionalists and New Rightists in the aim of placing Dugin accurately within the context of
extreme right-wing thought.
Concomitantly, Dugin’s mythomoteur can be assessed indirectly through a careful
understanding of the ideas espoused by the practitioners of Traditionalism such as Julius Evola.
Therefore this study examines the ideas behind perennial Traditionalism and its connection
with historical racist thought, particularly Ariosophy, sacred geography and the ideas behind
National Socialism. This is done in order to engage in the debate concerning Dugin’s
conception of race as well as his deviation from Traditional thought outlining the racial, but
ultimately spiritual, assessment of human beings in Evolian Traditionalism.
Thirdly, the mythomoteur of Alexander Dugin can be measured and assessed, if only
7

circumstantially, through the criticism and reproaches aimed at him by members of the openly
racist New Right or White Nationalists. Adherents of the New Right who have expressed
openly racist ideas question Dugin’s right to be among them. By examining their philosophical
grievances with Dugin’s claims on race this study can shed light on what truly shapes Dugin’s
worldview.
Based on the above mentioned research methods and materials, this study attempts to
answer the following questions: How does Alexander Dugin appraise national identity? Who
is a Russian and who is not? Does race or biology play a role in Dugin’s conceptualization of
national identity? How are Dugin’s ideas and arguments received by the broader New Right
community?
Ultimately, this work wishes to explain that Alexander Dugin professes a worldview
that is profoundly anti-modern, anti-liberal and anti-American. Neo-Eurasianism is a
dangerous ideology to world peace. Yet it is not a worldview that has a place for race or biology
as a meaningful factor in the historical development of national identities, despite the
accusations that scholars have levelled at Dugin’s ideas in the past.

8

Literature Review

Considering the massive body of literature produced by Dugin, scholars have attempted
to synthesize his vision in order to fully understand just what his goals truly are. He has
repeatedly and clearly stated that the United States’ global hegemony must be defeated and that
Russia must expand to include much of Eurasia and form an alliance with a pro-Russian Europe.
Yet his eclectic intellectual background drawn from the European New Right, interwar esoteric
religion, Russian Orthodoxy, and his own mystical Russian messianism has drawn scholars to
question just which factors most influence Dugin’s worldview, and, most importantly, through
what framework does Dugin define the Russian nation. Most scholars accept that Dugin’s
worldview constitutes a Russo-centric totalitarian program that in the very least has been
influenced by the German Conservative Revolutionary movement and a modicum of esoterica.
However, a central point of debate dominates the discourse on Alexander Dugin and his
philosophy. Specialists are divided on how to interpret Dugin’s nationalisms. Some scholars
emphasize Dugin’s use of arcane themes such as sacred geography as a means of covertly
espousing a racist or in the very least ethnic definition of identity. Conversely, other scholars
maintain that Dugin’s esoteric language is a manifestation of his fundamentalist religious
worldview.

9

Dugin and Race

One of the key debates centered on Dugin is how one can understand his approach to
race. His ideas draw heavily on a fascistic cult of action and violence and his Russian
expansionism coupled with conspiracy theories about a millennia-old war between the
mercantile West and spiritual East has earned him the reputation among some scholars as a
neo-fascist and covert anti-Semite. Marlene Laruelle admits that Dugin’s worldview a mixed
one and he has espoused often seemingly contradictory ideas. Nonetheless she contends that
Dugin’s worldview is in many ways colored by the concept of ethnicity and race. Laruelle
argues that Dugin has been mainly influenced by the racist aspect of perennial Traditionalism
through Julius Evola as well as the theory of ethnogenesis postulated by the revered Soviet
scholar Lev Gumilev. She maintains that despite his rhetoric extolling the virtues of a multicultural world Dugin is nonetheless a fervent Russian nationalist who envisions a new Russian
empire dominated by ethnic Russians.3
The first aspect of Dugin’s racial identification of nation, according to Laruelle, is his
links to Evolian Tradition and sacred geography. She emphasizes the strong correlation
between the esoteric proto-and post-Nazi Ariosophy of Guido von List and Jorg von
Liebensfels, and Dugin’s own esoteric language. The esoteric racist doctrine of the
Ariosophists claimed a racial homeland in the north called Atlantis, Thule, or Hyperborea. This
ancient homeland was the birthplace of the racially superior Aryan people who brought culture
and civilization to the world starting on the Indian subcontinent. Dugin, according to Laruelle,
creates a similar narrative. In his 1991 book, The Mysteries of Eurasia, Dugin claims that “the
continents have a symbolic significance.” 4 For Eurasia Dugin has discovered a northern
homeland in Siberia – thus giving the Russians a Nordic identity, something that is essential in
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a Nazi-inspired discourse. 5 By utilizing esoteric language, Laruelle argues, Dugin merely
covers what is in reality a highly racist worldview that sees Russians as a fundamentally Nordic,
and superior, people.
Additionally, Laruelle highlights Dugin’s intellectual debt to the works of Lev Gumilev,
the celebrated Soviet ethnologist.6 Gumilev’s theories, although very controversial in the West,
remain a mainstay for many Russian scientists, who adhere to their pseudo-scientific
examination of ethnicity. Gumilev posits a deterministic worldview that pits ethnicities against
one another. Gumilev’s conception of ethnicity is based largely on a “science of history” that
maintains that history can be predicted. Furthermore, Gumilev argued that ethnicities were
formed over centuries through peoples’ interactions with the territory and soil that they
inhabited. Ethnic mixing was strictly discouraged as the mixing of ethnicities would lead to the
weakening of the biological stock of ethnic groups. 7 Thus Laruelle maintains that despite
Dugin’s use of esoteric and religious language, he defines the Russian nation fundamentally
along ethnic or even racist lines.
Similarly, Edith Clowes’ book Russia on the Edge – Imagined Geographies and PostSoviet Identity is another example of scholarship that represents Dugin’s Traditionalist rhetoric
as largely ephemeral. 8 Clowes notes that Dugin’s flowery language of protecting national
specificities is largely a cover for a greater Russian project that sees the fulfillment of Russian
national interests as the only goal worth pursuing. By Clowes’ reckoning, in any neo-Eurasian
project the smaller nations inevitably will be swallowed up by its supposed protector, making
Dugin’s ideas nothing less than “political hypocrisy.”9 This political hypocrisy, according to
Clowes, extends to religious hypocrisy. She condemns Dugin’s supposed universalism when it
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comes to generally favorable references to all world religions while simultaneously extolling
the virtues of Russia for having Russian Orthodoxy as its official state religion.
Andreas Umland, who is a specialist on the post-communist Russian far right, has
written extensively on the Neo-Eurasian phenomenon. In 2007 he maintained that Dugin’s
worldview was fundamentally Traditionalist arguing, “being framed by the ideas of Evola and
other Traditionaists, Dugin sees Orthodoxy as only one of several religions that have preserved
the initial ‘tradition.”’ 10 However, Umland has recently questioned his own argument that
Dugin’s worldview is fundamentally colored by his religious worldview. Now Andreas Umland
along with Anton Shekhovtsov question the efficacy of calling Dugin a Traditionalist at all. In
the article, “Is Alexander Dugin a Traditionalist? Neo-Eurasianism and Perennial Philosophy,”
Umland and Shekhovtsov counter Mark Sedgwick’s argument11 that Dugin represents a recent,
albeit innovative, manifestation of René Guénon’s Traditionalist worldview. Umland and
Shekhovtsov emphasize the influence of Evola rather than Guénon on Dugin’s politics.
According to this argument Guénon’s Traditionalism was fundamentally based around
changing one’s own spiritual life in order to transcend modern decadence while Evola’s was
about changing society at large – often through violent means, thus neither Dugin or Evola
represent Guénonian Tradition.12 Shorn of the label of Traditionalist and its accompanying
universalism, Dugin’s ideas appear increasingly secular and fascist.
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Dugin and Tradition

Other scholars, however, hold that explaining Dugin’s nationalism within an ethnic or
racist paradigm makes little sense. In his discussion on nationalism in post-communist Russia,
Wayne Allensworth argues that Dugin’s religious approach bars Dugin from thinking of the
Russian nation along ethnic or racial lines. Allensworth suggests that Dugin is attempting to
create a new Russian mythomoteur.13 Appropriating the position of the Russian nation’s chief
storyteller, Dugin is creating a new narrative of Russian history and destiny that combines the
Perennial Tradition with Russian messianism. He underlines the Russian nation’s divine
mission to unite other cultures around a protective Russian empire. Thus, Allensworth
interprets Dugin’s definition of nation along religious, albeit esoteric, lines.
The theologian, James Heiser, has produced a recent monograph that examines Dugin’s
eschatological thought. In “’The American Empire Should Be Destroyed”’ Aleksander Dugin
and the Perils of Immanentized Eschatology” Heiser takes Dugin at his word that he is indeed
a Traditionalist. Heiser likens Dugin’s metaphysical outlook as something akin to political
religion and maintains that the links between Dugin’s Traditionalism and German racial
theories are largely superficial. While Dugin makes use of the themes of an ancient prehistorical mythic landmass to the north that spawned a superior people, Heiser emphasizes that
Dugin is largely talking about a spiritually superior people who held knowledge of the
perenneial Tradition. Consequently, Heiser also maintains that Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism is not
a racist ideology but fundamentally spiritual and religious.

The two debates discussed above represent the major points of conflict over how we
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are to interpret Dugin’s philosophical worldview. The present work supports a position close
to James Heiser’s own understanding of Dugin. Fundamentally, Dugin envisions reality in
genuinely religious and eschatological terms. Furthermore, it is accurate to describe Dugin as
a Traditionalist. Despite Andreas Umland’s contention that Julius Evola represented a major
break from Traditionalism, this study maintains that regardless of Evola’s difference in tactics
from that of Guénon, they both shared fundamentally the exact same world view. For both
Guénon and Evola the West was corrupt and dying, modernity and egalitarianism were great
societal ills, and the West needed to return to Traditional forms of religious practice in order to
save itself. Therefore, Dugin himself should be considered a Traditionalist.
This study also argues that Edith Clowes’ interpretation of Dugin as a jingoist Russian
nationalist, as well as Marlene Laruelle’s argument that Dugin’s worldview is heavily colored
by Ariosophy and Julius Evola’s racist worldview, are both not entirely correct. The present
work will argue that despite his anti-liberalism and philosophical association with racial
theorists, Dugin genuinely believes in what he says and that it is possible to participate in
Evolian Traditionalism and not be a racist. Evola was indeed a racist. However, his racial
theories were dominated by a belief in a “race of the spirit” as he saw biological racism as a
symptom of decadent and modern scientific reductionism.
In addition to an attempt at contributing to the ongoing debate on Dugin, this work will
utilize a source of material that many scholars have not utilized – the writings of the current
New Right on Dugin. While it is certainly not a monolithic movement, the New Right has
produced a bevy of literature that can help shed light on Dugin and how he views race.

14

Theoretical Framework

Theories of Nationalism

The scholarly discussion concerning the study of nationalism and collective identities
is a highly contested one. Indeed, the debate on defining exactly what constitutes a nation is
one of the hallmarks of this thematic field. Nonetheless, many scholars agree on two
fundamental points: A nation is neither a state nor an ethnic community.14 A nation can also be
a state but usually a state relates to institutional activities whereas a nation is a community. A
nation is a fundamentally lived experience whose members share the same homeland and
national stories. Similarly, a nation cannot be an ethnic community because whereas a nation
has a homeland or at least a sense of territory, an ethnic group does not have to be in possession
of its historic territory.15 For the purposes of this thesis, I will use Anthony D. Smith’s definition
which says, “…The concept of nation is a named human community residing in a perceived
homeland and having common myths and a shared history, a distinct public culture, and
common laws and customs for all members.”16 Nationalism, then, is an ideology that strives
to inculcate and protect the sense of identity of a mass of people that constitute the nation.
The scholarly debate over what is a nation and nationalism can be divided into two very
broad camps: Primordialist and Modernist. Primordialists have insisted that nationality is
fundamentally based in the deep past and that a nation is largely an extension of a real or
imagined family or clan. However, the majority of scholars on nationalism today seem to
largely emphasize the modern nature of national identities, pointing to the changes in
technology and modes of production that have forced groups to re-evaluate their concept of
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community.
The primordialist approach to the study of nationalism maintains that nationhood has
been a facet of human nature since the Bronze age or even earlier.17 Built around expanding
kin groups and shared histories and myths, according to primordialists, nations were in
existence millennia before the French Revolution. They contend that recorded histories of
ancient peoples and archaeological studies prove that nations and ethnic communities have
long been part of the human experience and that “there is nothing particularly modern about
nationalism, nor is it likely to disappear… 18 ” The Hebrews are cited as an example of
nationhood being a pre-modern concept actively taken up by peoples. They did, after all, have
a culture based around a unique religion, maintained a national homeland and had genealogical
records. This sense of nationhood followed them even during the Diaspora as Hebrew remained
the language of Judaism.
Primordialists also draw on the history of Ancient Greece and its community of the
polis as an example of pre-modern national identity. The ancient Greeks, despite the many
political and cultural differences between their many independent city-states, nonetheless
espoused a sense of identity that went beyond the polis. The Greeks viewed those who did not
share the general Hellenic culture as barbarians and often went on campaigns in defense of
other Greeks; particularly against the Persian Empire. Spartans and Athenians, despite the
chasm between their forms of government and cultures, nonetheless were able to unite together
as a combined Hellenic force against invaders such as the Persians. Indeed, primordialists even
see a sort of proto-irredentism in the Greek cities’ attempts to reconquer Hellenic cities along
the Ionian coast.
The contention that the nation has existed since essentially the beginning of time has
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fostered a plethora of differing interpretations of the nation through time. One paradigm of the
primordial nation can be described as ethno-biological primordialism. It postulates that nations
can be traced back to racial or biologically-similar communities whose drives for reproduction
were determined by a need to strengthen the gene pool. Thus a nation is essentially a large,
biologically-defined kin group whose symbols and myths correspond to actual ethnic or
biological origins.19 Another facet of primordialist thought emphasizes the shared “cultural
givens,” or cultural inheritance passed down from generation to generation, of nations. 20
According to its leading proponent, Clifford Geertz, continued cultural givens such as ethnicity,
local traditions and religion all constitute a real sense of nation. 21 However, unlike some
primordialists who believe in the reality of some nation’s fixed social, cultural, and ethnic
continuities throughout history, Geertz allows for the much more likely possibility that these
continuities are just imagined. Geertz emphasizes a nation’s need to believe in the primordiality
of a people’s ethnicity or nation.22 Thus, Geertz’s primordialism allows for the notion of a
constructed past that is in fact outside of reality.
Another strain of primordialist thought is one championed by spiritual nationalists who
have been highly influenced by European Romanticism as well as their own professed faith.
This method of explaining nationhood and national identity is largely focused on explaining a
nation or ethnicity’s divinely-inspired plan. If the nation existed during the first human
civilizations, and humans were divinely created, then the nation itself is a part of the divine
plan. In early history, this sort of spiritual nationalism may be attributed to the ancient Hebrews
and their belief that they were a “chosen people.” More recently and closer to the modern,
secular era many European powers and the United States utilized a narrative that was similar;
maintaining that it was their God-given duty to bring civilization and Christianity to East Asia
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and Africa. This culture-bearing civilizing mission became a defining trait of many early
Russian thinkers’ sense of national identity, which maintained that the Russian people,
representing the Orthodox Christian traits of simplicity, rootedness, and communalism must
champion and spread true Christian values to Central Asia as opposed to the materialistic values
of the Latin West. Other thinkers, such as Johann Gottfried von Herder, maintained a less
evangelical concept of the nation. He held that each nation, defined as it was by language and
a divine idea, must be given the freedom to express itself. In all cases of spiritual nationalism,
the nation is defined by its divinely-given mission.
A very similar school of thought to the primordialist position is that of perennialsm.
Like the primordialists, perennialists argue that nations have existed centuries or even millennia
prior to the advent of modernity. However, they fully accept that nationalism is a purely modern
phenomenon.23 Contrary to primordialism, perennialists such as Joshua Fishman argue that
nations are strictly social and historical phenomena and do not occur naturally.24 The historical
nation, then, is a shared experience through community, not necessarily through kinship..
Perennialism comes in two main forms. The first, continuous perennialism, essentially posits
that many nations have persistently existed throughout time as the same shared cultural
experience for centuries prior to modernity such as the French, English and Russians.25 The
second strain of perennialist thought is recurrent perennialism: this school of thought argues
that various nations can come into existence and disappear over time but the idea of a national
community has existed essentially since the first formations of human societies.26
The second and most widely-accepted major explanation of how the nation and
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nationalism developed is advanced by the modernist school. The modernist theory of
nationalism is represented by many scholars such as Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson
who emphasize different aspects of the constructed nature of the nation. Some scholars
emphasize the deliberate decision of economic and political elites to foster a new, ethnolinguistic national identity that transcended previous local and class identities in order to
maximize economic profit and facilitate easier administration of increasingly centralized states.
The nation must have been not only a modern idea, but also a modern reality because prior to
modern societies, there had been no need or means of conceiving the idea of a national
community.
Prior to industrialization and the advent of modern capitalism, society was feudal. In
these feudal societies, the major economic preoccupation was agriculture. A gradual shift from
a feudal economy and social order to an industrialized, urban and centralizing society and state
was legitimized intellectually initially by Renaissance Humanism and later developed during
the Enlightenment. 27 The human ability to understand complicated but rational systems in
nature led to a belief that humans could also create a rational and efficiently run society.
Consequently, standardization of social interaction became increasingly important. Speakers
of local languages and dialects, once left to their own devices in largely isolated communities
of the feudal era, were put under pressure to conform to a new, standardized language that was
largely a reflection of the dialect of the national capital, such as Parisian French. With a
universally accepted linguistic standard, workers could be more easily trained on how to
perform their duties and bureaucrats could more effectively run government and local affairs.
Ultimately local identities were subsumed by a broader national one in the name of
administrative efficiency and economic profit.
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While the above explanation of the emergence of the modern nation emphasizes
economic factors, other scholars maintain that nationalism was born out of cultural necessity.
Pointing to the growing educated and cosmopolitan elite, Ernest Gellner maintains that national
consciousness was born naturally out of the emergence of unifying national languages and
culture. 28 In Gellner’s approach, national identity and industrialism partake in a symbiotic
relationship. Industrialization and the necessity for linguistic and technical standardization
foster a sense of national identity which in turn nurtures industrialization. Conversely, some
modernist scholars hold that the nation is an inherently ideological construct. Rather than
having been created by the needs of political and economic elites, nations and nation-building
were a direct result of the Enlightenment and nationalist ideologies. Born out of Kantian ideas
of self-determination combined with an increasingly literate populace, nationalism was a
natural outgrowth of many contemporary intellectuals’ drive to create homogenous nations.
Thus, in this ideological model, intellectuals, not political elites, have agency and are the
primary bearers of nationalism.29
Other modernists, however, emphasize the purely constructed nature of nationalism. In
his seminal work, Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson contends that a nation is a
socially constructed entity, imagined by individuals who perceive themselves as part of that
entity. The advent of print capitalism, and the entrepreneurial mass distribution of printed
works in the vernacular, allowed the literate to mentally envision a larger community who
shared their language. With a broader understanding of their linguistic community, peoples
formed a concept of their nation as inherently finite yet sovereign. Its borders were fixed and
the people, those who shared in the vernacular language and culture, embraced this new sense
of national identity.30Additionally, improved infrastructure enabled formerly relatively isolated
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communities to imagine a world outside of their own immediate village or town. Yet, Anderson
emphasizes, the nation envisioned is a psychologically constructed one. The lack of face-toface interaction with the entirety of the nation necessitates the use of an individual’s
imagination to form a national community.
Like Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm contends that the nation and nationalism are both
necessarily products of modernity. However, Hobsbawm introduces a Marxist approach to the
historiography of the nation and emphasizes the agency of elites in the nation-building process.
Hobsbawm is a critic of the national project, and emphasizes that political and economic elites
have essentially fostered a false sense of national consciousness among large social groups in
order to better control them. Nations and nationalism were largely forged in Europe from
around 1830-1870 according to Hobsbawm. During these years a wealth of historical and
literary works helped create a sense of collective identity among the masses. A bevy of
“invented traditions” followed suit; the creation of national flags, music, songs, histories,
festivals and ceremonies of national mourning and celebration were means by which the ruling
elites forged national identity.31 Made to appear as if the traditions were centuries old and thus
providing their practice with some legitimacy, they were simply recent innovations.
Accordingly, Hobsbawm views nations as essentially social constructs, created by modern
elites as a means of fostering a false sense of identity crafted by social engineers as a means of
controlling people through their emotional attachment to an abstraction.32
Recent scholarship by Rogers Brubaker has brought about a new way of engaging in
the ideas of race, ethnicity and nation. Brubaker argues that scholars should look at nationhood
and identity not as an actuality but as a cognitive process.33 In other words, national identities
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should be seen not as “things in the world, but perspectives on the world.34” The human mind,
he argues, naturally creates categories such as ethnicity and national identity as a means of
making sense of our world. Thus, instead of trying to define what a nation really is, scholars
are better off asking why humans have for so long seen things through an ethnic lens.
While the modernist approach dominates the field of nationalism studies, there is a third
broad current of thought that acts as a sort of mediating theory between modernism and
primordialism. This third paradigm of ethno-symbolism, which seeks to explain nations and
nationalism, is one that emphasizes the continuities of ethnic communities throughout history
while still not engaging in a primordialist account of history. The nation is not something that
is invented, but rather the nation is something that has been reinterpreted. Contrary to the
modernist approach, ethno-symbolists maintain that nation is not a purely elite-dominated
construction, nor is it necessarily modern. Rather, they emphasize that throughout history
interplay between elites and the middle- and lower-strata of society have together created a
sense of national community. Anthony D. Smith uses the nineteenth-century Gaelic revival in
Ireland as an example of the reciprocal nature of the elite and non-elite participation in a
common identity-forming project. 35 By the late nineteenth-century the Irish language was
becoming more and more of a provincial language as English increasingly became the main
language of public discourse. A Gaelic League was established by lower-class Irishmen in order
to protect and encourage the use of Irish as the main language of the island. Utilizing traditional
Catholic and Irish-language symbols in their drive for the reinstitution of the Irish language,
these same symbols were later taken up by members of the Irish intellectuals.
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Besides the emphasis placed on the reciprocal identity-forming relations of elites and
non-elites, ethno-symbolists maintain that any account of nation-forming must take into
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account the longue durée.37Influenced by the Annales School of historiography, the political
scientist John A. Armstrong maintains that only through examining a historical subject in the
long term can specialists avoid applying anachronistic labels to historical subjects. Armstrong
created the concept of the myth-symbol complex; a collection of stories and symbols specific
to the ethnic core of a nation that have been gathered, recast, and retold through the
generations. 38 Consequently, to understand the phenomenon of a specific nation and
nationalism, it is imperative that one examines it over the process of generations and even
centuries.
Subsequently, the ethno-symbolic approach stresses the importance of locating the
modern nation within the long-term time span of previous ethnic communities. Smith maintains
that this is not an easy task; the link between an ethnic community and its later manifestation
as a nation is tenuous and hard to track. On the other hand, nations can be seen as competing
with other ethnic groups such as the Flemish and Walloons within Belgium or Basques and
Catalans within Spain.39 Thus nations and ethnic groups, what Smith calls ethnies can be seen
as a part of a broader cultural family of communities. This ethno-cultural community might be
able to explain why national groups in the present utilize myths and symbols of earlier ethnic
communities that may not actually have been ancestors – such as early Russian Eurasianism’s
cult of the Mongolian nomad.
A fourth facet of the ethno-symbolist approach is how it explains the sometimes deep
attachments fostered by nationalism. These attachments can sometimes lead to political
extremism, terrorism, and a belief in the superiority or the messianic mission of a nation. While
primordialists can either emphasize an ethno-biological or a spiritual or largely culturallinguistic definition of nation, and a modernist its recent emergence, the ethno-symbolist
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highlights the nation’s historical ethnic core. This ethnic core, real or imagined, constitutes a
powerful symbol to the individual member of his nation. A mixture of a feeling of ethnic
belonging combined with shared symbols, myths, and histories create a strong sense of
belonging. Therefore, the ethno-symbolist maintains, it is not likely that ultranationalism and
nationalist violence will go away any time soon.
Ultimately, the ethno-symbolist approach posits that a nation is defined by its mythsymbol complex which has been passed down from generation to generation through an ethnic
group’s storytellers. This collection of collectively recognized symbols and myths, along with
its main narrative myth, what Smith calls the “mythomoteur,” gives a nation its sense of
meaning. Smith recognizes three major types of mythomoteur: the communal-political, the
communal-religious, and the dynastic. In order for the modern nation to be constructed, it must
have already had a common ethnic core along with a myth-symbol complex that resonates
psychologically enough with the different provinces and localities a nationalist project wishes
to integrate. If it does not, it must re-invent one or risk collapsing. Thus the only successful
nations, the ones who have been able to successfully integrate somewhat different territories
into a collective national collectivity, are those that have a sufficiently appealing
mythomoteur.40
Wayne Allensworth follows this logic by using the French nation as an example.41 He
maintains that it was much easier to make Frenchmen out of Bretons and Gascoqne, compared
to Algerian Arabs, even though both groups speak French and Algeria had at one time been a
part of France. This is because Bretons and Gascoqne share a closer tie to the French mythsymbol complex than Algerian Arabs do. While Gascoqne and Bretons might have their own
particular local traditions and histories, they nonetheless share a myth-symbol complex that
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includes Catholicism, the history of the Hundred Years war and memory of the French
monarchy. On the other hand, despite the history between Algeria and France, Algerian Arabs
have a much different myth-symbol complex that includes the Islamic faith and its symbols, as
well as a completely different ethnic background. Additionally Algerians utilize a different
mythomoteur that includes anti-imperialism due in part to the violent relationship between
France and its Algerian colony. 42 An example of a constructed yet successful modern
mythomoteur would be that of the nation of Israel. Although the Hebrews had been away from
their ancient homeland for centuries and had been separated throughout a diaspora, the
formation of an Israeli national idea was largely successful. Despite the linguistic and ethnic
differences between many Jews repatriated to Israel in the latter half of the twentieth century,
Israel nonetheless produced a salient mythomoteur that included key parts of ancient Hebrew
and modern Jewish history such as the Exodus, King David, and the Holocaust, all of which
became part of Israel’s constitutive national myth.
Smith notes that most constitutive myths of ethnic origins follow a similar format. The
blueprint includes the following:
1. a myth of origins in time; i.e. when the community was ‘born’;
2. a myth of origins in space; i.e. where the community was ‘born’;
3. a myth of ancestry; i.e. who bore us, and how we are descended from him/her;
4. a myth of migration; i.e. whither we wandered;
5. a myth of liberation; i.e. how we were freed;
6. a myth of the golden age; i.e. how we became great and heroic;
7. a myth of decline; i.e. how we decayed and were conquered/exiled;
8. a myth of rebirth; i.e. how we shall be restored to our former glory.43
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According to Smith, a large ethnic group that wishes to absorb other, smaller ones in order to
create a nation must draw on enough of the mythic elements of the narrative blueprint listed
above and must share enough commonalities with the lesser groups to be a foundation for a
shared national identity. Thus the ethno-symbolist approach is in some ways a happy medium
between the other two broad currents of thought on nationalism and national identity. Its
emphasis on the primacy of an ethnic core and a constitutive national mythology of a nation’s
origins and its past history is a means of accepting the often pre-modern nature of nations. At
the same time, ethno-symbolism represents a compromise with modernism by allowing that
while a nation’s essence, real or imagined, is inherently pre-modern in its myth structure, the
nation itself usually requires the construction of a myth-symbol complex in order to incorporate
smaller yet similar groups into the nation. Thus the making of a nation remains in some ways
a social construct.
Neo-Eurasianism cannot be explained through a primordialist conception of Russian
nationhood or a greater supranational project such as the construction of a Eurasian identity.
Primordialism presupposes the existence of a national identity prior to the advent of modernity
and this is clearly not the case with Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism which has a decidedly
constructivist aspect. At the same time, the modernist approach to national identity cannot
adequately explain Dugin’s approach to and utilization of myths and symbols, drawn from both
Traditionalism and historical Russian messianism.
Thus, in order to better understand Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist project, and the role that
the Russian nation will play in it, it is important to utilize a conception of nationalism that can
be applied to a multi-faceted body of thought such as Dugin’s. The ethno-symbolic approach
to national identity studies is a useful prism through which to examine Alexander Dugin’s
conceptualization of national identity. This is in part because ethno-symbolism is an excellent
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“compromise” between the primordialist and modernist camps because it acknowledges the
possibility that national identity can be formed from a combination of pre-modern as well as
modern, constructivist, influences. Thus, utilizing the idea of a myth-symbol complex we are
able to see how Dugin constructs identity through a combination of Traditional and esoteric
stories to explain the meaning and ultimately the destiny of Russia.
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Chapter 1: Alexander Dugin: His Political Life and Ideas

His ideology is not grounded upon racial or ethnic notions of identity, despite his
fascistic leanings. Nor does he participate in the Early Eurasianist belief in the fundamental
Asian character of Russians. Rather, Dugin’s ideology is grounded in the esoteric belief in a
Perennial Tradition of which Orthodox Christianity and other Eurasian traditional religions
represent facets of a single divine truth. Combining a myth-symbol complex utilizing a mixture
of Traditionalist belief in Russia’s messianic need to unify and protect other peoples of eastern
Orthodox faith and a reverence for Russia’s simpler past, Dugin has created a mythomoteur
that constitutes a new identity for the Russian national; that of the divinely-inspired unifying
force to bring Russia and the rest of the world not to Orthodoxy, but to the Perennial Tradition.
Dugin has participated in Russian politics in one capacity or another since before the
end of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency. In 1998 Dugin participated in the Pamyat organization,
hoping to bring to it his more esoteric explanation of Russian history. However, Pamyat’s
reactionary monarchism and unbridled anti-Semitism reportedly drove Dugin away. After the
split, Dugin founded several institutions such as the publishing house Arctogaia Association
and became an unofficial advisor to Gennady Zyuganov, the head of the Communist Party of
the Russian Federation (CPRF). Next Dugin attempted to form his own political party. Working
with Eduard Limonov he formed the National Bolshevik Party (NBP) which utilized a radical
synthesis of both Stalinist and National Socialist symbolism and rhetoric.44 Directly inspiring
Zhirinovsky’s 1994 autobiography The Last Drive to the South, Dugin has called for a new
Russian empire to expand into the former Soviet Union, northern China, Central Asia and also
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Eastern Europe. Dugin has a presence in Russian academia as a professor of sociology at
Moscow State University and is the Director of the Center for Conservative Studies at MSU.
Furthermore Dugin is a television personality, having participated in political discussions on
Russian as well as foreign programs, including one broadcast from Iran. A prolific writer, he
has served as advisor to the State Duma and his Foundations of Geopolitics has been on the
required reading lists of Russian military officer schools. His work has been rumored to have
had the ear of Putin himself from time to time.45
In his 2001 manifesto of the Eurasianist Movement, Dugin decried a fallen world in
which totalitarian uniformity and consumerism are the only hallmarks of the modern life.46
Additionally angered by the seeming political and ideological apathy of the masses, he wrote,
“The majority of political parties and formalized social movements pursue tactical purposes.
Practically nowhere can be found an explicit and consequent ideology capable to snatch man
from a state of sleepy indifference, to make life worth living.”47 For Dugin, this philosophical
ennui has been largely fostered by the victory of American liberal democracy and
Americanization of the cultures of the world, which he describes as an “Atlanticist tsunami.”48
In addition to what he sees as the death of ideology, Dugin also mourns the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, which he regards an unmitigated disaster. According to Dugin, the end of the
Soviet Union meant the effective end of organized opposition to globalization and
Americanization. However, rather than a restoration of the Soviet Union Dugin proposes a new
political union, a Eurasian one. A Eurasianist empire would stretch into territories and countries
that neither the Russian Empire nor the Soviet Union had ever ruled over. The Eurasianist
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movement represents a supranational project that will unite many different religions and ethnic
groups into a single empire. On the surface, Dugin’s geopolitical vision appears to be driven
by a desire for the maximization of Russian power and influence. To some extent, that is correct.
However, pregnant within Dugin’s territorial ambitions for a Eurasianist empire are Traditional
ideas of sacred space as well as a new ideological model of identity. The model incorporates
ideas of both civilization and the spiritual missions of peoples as constitutive facets of identity.
The Eurasianist project ultimately posits a new mythomoteur for Russians by portraying Russia
as an important “glue” to a greater Eurasian empire, thus fulfilling its divinely-ordained
mission – to be a uniter of peoples.
In Dugin’s popular work, The Fourth Political Theory, he proposes that in order to
counter the deculturating effects of modernity and globalization, a new ideology must be
created. He argues that the modern world has seen the advent of three major ideologies;
liberalism, communism, and fascism.49 Of the three, only liberalism has survived the wars that
the competing systems had spawned. He then posits that of the three major ideologies, each
one had a primary agent that effectively “moved” history and that all three believed in monolinear time that was deterministic and utopian.50 In the case of liberalism, the major historical
actor was the individual. Dugins’s views on liberalism are similar to those proposed by the
Nouvelle Droite. The history of the individual was one of progress and liberation in which the
individual is “liberated from all things external to oneself.”51 This leads to the individual’s
renunciation of his God and spiritual upbringing, then his community, his family, and even his
gender. In the ideology of liberalism, Dugin fears, lies self-destruction. In the same vein,
communism also espoused a belief in the inevitable progress of man. However, communism’s
major historical subject was not the individual but class. According to communist discourse
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class conflict determined human history and it was a scientific reality that eventually a
worldwide proletarian revolution would occur and create a utopian, classless society. However,
Dugin views communism as a horrible alternative to liberalism because it shares its materialism,
scientific determinism, and atheistic spirit.52 The third ideology, fascism, exemplified by the
statism of Fascist Italy and the unfettered biological racism of National Socialism, apparently
disgusts Dugin. Dugin rails against racism and the “criminal practice of wiping out entire ethnic
groups…” and blames it as the sole cause of the Second World War. 53 Simultaneously he
decries the guilt by association experienced by Conservative Revolutionaries and the
vilification of their ideas as a form of “racism.”54 Indeed, liberalism, concomitant with a culture
of political correctness and an incontrovertible faith in its universalizing mission, represents
another form of “racism” for Dugin.
According to Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory, he rejects both communism and fascism
as inadequate models to combat what he sees as the sinister destructiveness of liberalism.
Instead, Dugin proposes a new historical “subject:” civilization. Advancing the concept of
civilization as a historical actor in the modern world, Dugin has effectively created a vehicle
and intellectual justification for his Eurasianist project. Admitting that the definition of
civilization is highly contested, he posits a challenge to Samuel P. Huntington’s register of
civilizations. In his influential work The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington argued that there
was a Western civilization embodying North America, Canada, Australia and much of Europe,
as well as Latin American, African, Islamic, Japanese, Sinic, Hindu, Buddhist and Orthodox
civilizations. 55 Dugin asserts that Canada and the United States, along with the United
Kingdom, are not part of Western civilization but rather an Atlanticist current within Western
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civilization along with the United Kingdom. 56 Indeed, Europe is divided between a
fundamentally Atlanticist and Continental Europe, the latter wishing closer ties with Russia as
well as the loosening of ties with the United States and globalization in general. Similarly,
Dugin rejects Huntington’s appraisal of Orthodox civilization, containing much of the Balkans
and the former Soviet Union. Rather, Dugin maintains that Orthodox civilization should be
understood as a part of a greater Eurasian civilization, including Mongols, Turks, Caucasians,
and “a significant proportion of the population professing Islam,” all with shared histories with
Russia.57 In his attempt at devising a political theory to be used to counter globalization, Dugin
argues for a civilizational model that sees a much strengthened Russia.
One of the most important works written by Alexander Dugin is Osnovi
Geopolitiki, or The Foundations of Geopolitics. It is a work that articulates in detail Dugin’s
territorial basis for the dismantlement of what he sees as American global domination and the
rise of a great Eurasian empire united by the Russian nation. In order to bring down American
global hegemony Dugin proposes a massive alliance that will utilize the resources and
manpower of Asia and Europe. Simultaneously, Dugin calls for the support of any American
separatist movements, including “Afro-American racists,” in order to destabilize and weaken
the United States.58 Additionally, Dugin maintains that only an extreme redrawing of the world
map will ensure the fulfillment of Russia’s spiritual mission and a return to a multi-polar world.
Dugin proposes the formation of several alliance systems between Russia and other
partners to ensure the success of the Eurasianist project. Firstly, a Moscow-Berlin axis should
be formed. To realize it, Russia would return East Prussia back to Germany which, along with
France, would also dominate much of Scandinavia and central and southern Europe. 59 In
addition, a similar Moscow-Tokyo alliance, along with India and Vietnam, will ensure the
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dismemberment of China’s borderlands, as Dugin considers China to be an enemy to any
Eurasianist mission. In compensation, China would receive de facto hegemony over Southeast
Asia excluding Vietnam as well as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia. Japan would
receive the Kurile Islands back from Russia and be allowed to pursue an imperial policy not
unlike that of Imperial Japan during the Second World War. 60 The Pacific islands, and
presumably Hawaii too, would fall under Japanese control. The final major alliance proposed
by Dugin is one with Islamic Iran which he considers a natural ally of Russia against American
cultural imperialism and thus willing to provide naval bases for the Russian navy, allowing it
access to the Indian Ocean.61 Turkey would also be severely weakened with the secession of a
Kurdish state but ultimately gain its own hegemony over much of the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan,
Iraq, and Syria. Ultimately, the borders of a Eurasian-Russian empire would include not only
almost all of the former Soviet Union, but also Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang, almost all of the
Caucusus, Finland, Poland, and almost all of the Balkans.62
Russian imperialists have historically utilized a missionary and evangelical message to
justify expansionism. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Russian Empire often
maintained that the spread of Russian influence throughout Central and East Asia was
necessary to bring the light of Orthodoxy and the just rule of the Tsars to the native peoples.
When dealing with the Balkan Slavs or the Ottoman Empire the official narrative espoused by
Russian authorities was that Russia needed to protect Slavic and Orthodox minorities from the
persecutions of non-Orthodox rulers. Similarly, the creation of the Soviet Union led to a change
in the justificatory language of Russian expansion, but not its fundamental mission to expand
state power. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Putin’s Russia has argued for the protection of
ethnic Russians in the “near-abroad.” In the name of protecting ethnic Russians, the Russian
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Federation has violently attempted to dismember its neighbors as can be seen in the 2008 war
with Georgia and the more recent annexation of Crimea and the support of pro-Russian
separatists in eastern Ukraine. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
constriction of Russia’s borders have meant that pursuing an ethnic justification of expansion
is problematic for greater imperial goals. This is because most of the ethnic Russians requiring
“protection” are along the borders of Russia and within former Soviet Union republics. Thus,
any plans to successfully extend Russia’s current borders into former Soviet republics would
more than likely require force and a convincing ideological motive. Alexander Dugin’s NeoEurasianism represents a potentially very useful ideological tool to articulate what he sees as a
necessary expansion of Russian territory.
Yet Dugin’s philosophical and geopolitical worldview was not created in a vacuum.
Indeed, his conception of a Russia that transcends both East and West and is, in fact, a unifier
of peoples is nothing new. Ideas attributing a specifically Eurasian character to Russia can be
traced back to the work of a small group of Russian dissident intellectuals who went into selfexile in Europe during the Russian Civil War. During the 1920s they formulated a philosophy
of Eurasianism that contained the geopolitical goals and idealization of Russia’s history that is
present in Dugin’s philosophy today. Similarly, Dugin is not alone in his post-war antiliberalism and anti-modernism.
Indeed, Dugin’s anti-democratic conclusions harken back to the French Nouvelle Droite
of the Cold War era. This intellectual movement aims at dismantling what they see as American
hegemony over Europe and has had a profound influence on Dugin’s own thinking and the
Neo-Eurasian mythomoteur. In order to understand the nature of Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist
doctrine it is imperative to place his ideas in a historical context. Employing the ethnosymbolist approach to nationhood and the concept of the mythomoteur, I will trace the
ideological lineage of Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism back to the early Eurasianists of the interwar
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period, Lev Gumilev’s ethnic theories as well as the ideas espoused by members of the Nouvelle
Droite.
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Chapter 2: Early Eurasianism, Lev Gumilev and the French Nouvelle Droite

During the Russian Civil War a plethora of constitutive myths flourished not only in Russia
proper but also in the Russian émigré community. Indeed the Civil War was in many ways a
war between competing mythomoters. For the Bolsheviks, the meaning of Russia was defined
by its war against international capitalism. With the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922 Russia
became a nominally equal partner in a union of politically like-minded but linguistically and
culturally diverse republics. Generally speaking, prior to Stalin the chief paradigm through
which communist discourse was viewed was always that of class. According to the communist
narrative, to be Russian was to be part of a larger international proletarian revolution. On the
other hand the White movement was deeply divided. Monarchists who fought against the
Bolsheviks championed a pre-revolutionary adoration for Tsar and Church. Their Russia was a
Russia very similar to the Russia that existed before the First World War. Others wanted a
liberalized and democratized Russia and largely viewed Russia as a part of Europe, thus
connecting their “imagined nation” to the Enlightenment and Western liberal apostles of free
market capitalism. Still others created a completely new approach to Russian history and
nationhood.
The Eurasianists were a relatively small and diverse group of Russian émigrés who
initially fled to Central Europe and the Balkans after the Bolshevik seizure of power. Led by
the geographer and economist Petr Savitsky, the ethnographer Nikolai Trubetzkoy, and the
historian George Vernadsky and containing linguists, philosophers and theologians, the
Eurasianists were an eclectic mix of intellectuals. 63 Simultaneously revolutionary and
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conservative and fascinated by Benito Mussolini’s Fascist experiment in Italy, they articulated
a complex critique of previous notions of Russian identity while maintaining Russia’s
“otherness” from Europe.64 Fundamentally, the Eurasianists posited a romantic territoriallybased mythomoteur that theorized that Russian history, as well as Russianness, was defined by
the territory it occupied.
Despite their unique approach to Russian history, the movement itself made little impact
on contemporary discourse. This was in part because of the movement’s factionalism; the
Eurasianists were deeply split on their approach to communism and the Bolshevik victory in
1922.65 Some Eurasianists, devoted Orthodox Christians and critics of rationalism, were deeply
skeptical of the atheistic and materialistic worldview espoused by communism. Thus for
Trubetzkoy and others of like mind the Soviet Union was an eternal enemy. After the
communist victory in the civil war many contemporaries feared that the red menace would
spread successfully to the rest of the world. However, when the world revolution did not happen
and the Soviet Union adopted the New Economic Policy some Eurasianists started to consider
the Bolshevik revolution as not a truly communist one, but a Russian one. Seeing in the New
Economic Policy as a more contained version of socialist economics and the Soviet Union as
a multi-national state no longer encumbered by centuries of monarchy, many Eurasianists
believed that with their influence the Soviet Union might be transformed into a state more
suitable to their worldview.66 Others, more dubious, maintained that the Soviet Union was a
manifestation of Russian “Westernism” and needed to be completely done away with. The
Eurasianists never posited a comprehensive political platform. Indeed, they were never able to
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decide as a whole whether or not Eurasianism should remain an academic school of thought or
an actual popular movement. Nonetheless, taken as a whole the fractious proponents of
Eurasianism proposed a new historical, quasi-religious and territorial myth-symbol complex
for Russia.
The relationship between Russia and the east had been largely ambivalent throughout
the Imperial period. Central and East Asia were largely seen as a target of territorial and
economic expansion for the Russian empire. For the Russian state as well as many
conservatives, Russia was culturally closer to Europe than Asia. The historiography of the
contemporary Russian state traced its roots largely through Kievan Rus’ and Muscovy. Russia
was the “Third Rome,” heir to the Greek Orthodox cultural and religious tradition. The
Eurasianists, however, criticized the emphasis laid on Russia’s Byzantine heritage as eurocentric and instead underscored Russia’s Eastern heritage through a romanticizing of the
Steppe and a historical heritage bequeathed by the Mongols and nomadism. Thus they
distanced themselves from Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism, maintaining that non-Russian
Slavdom was a part of Europe. They concluded that early Russian history was a meeting
between “forest and steppe” – Russian and Turanian.67
Eurasianist historiography focuses on the Mongol Yoke period from the fourteenth
through the sixteenth centuries. During this period all of the Russian states submitted to and
became vassals of the Golden Horde. While other Russians decried this period in Russian
history as a great injustice and lauded the heroics of Ivan III of Muscovy for finally ending
Russian vassalage, the Eurasianists saw the Golden Horde’s dominion as fundamentally
healthy. During the period under the “Mongol Yoke,” Eurasianists contended that many
Russian nobles intermarried with members of the Golden Horde, which served to reawaken
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Russia’s true identity. Sedentary village life, the hallmark of life for many conservatives, was
to be replaced by a nomadism of the spirit.68 With the retreat of the Golden Horde and the
collapse of Mongolian hegemony over much of the Eurasian continent, it became the Russian
people’s mission to reunite much of the Mongol world. Russia’s identity as a universal unifier
was presumably inherited from its Mongol past. The Mongol Empire at its furthest extent
stretched from what is now Manchuria to the Hungarian plains and from southern Siberia to
the Himalaya Mountains. Some Eurasianists believed that it was Russia’s destiny to rule over
a similarly sized space. Russia’s geographic position, like that of the Mongol Khanate of
Genghis and Kublai Khan, gave it a certain historical predilection for empire building.
However, this new empire that the Russians were destined to build was not to be one
that necessarily centered purely on Russian interests. Rather, it was to a universal empire.
Indeed, Russia could not exist authentically without empire.69 The Eurasianists believed that
only a country that exhibited a dual nature, being of both the West and the East could be one
of the successful “centers of the world.”70 The Mongolian empire justly ruled over much of the
Indo-Chinese world and at its height reached the Mediterranean world. Containing Christians,
Muslims, Buddhists of varying shades and countless local religions, the realm conquered by
Genghis Khan’s was fashioned a “United Empire of Mankind.”71 Because the Russians were
now heir to the Mongol heritage, they too could form a universal empire that included countless
nations and religions. This new Eurasian empire, encompassing as it did various peoples and
religions, could not take on a single cultural or ethnic identity. Rather, the founding identity for
this collective empire was a quasi-religious belief in the Eurasian people’s unity through a
common destiny. Russia, being neither fully of the West nor of the East, was the connecting
element that fostered a universally just empire.
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The Eurasian mythomoteur, grounded as it was in a Mongolian and nomadic mythsymbol complex also drew heavily on the belief in the trait-forming abilities of territory and
geography on peoples. Furthermore, they generally continued the narrative that the Russian (or
Eurasian) world was a third continent – neither wholly European nor Asian. The Eurasianists
maintained that geography was the chief means of explaining the unity of a greater Eurasian
culture and that there was a fundamentally organic link between a geographic space and a
people’s culture. The geographer Petr Savitsky proposed the idea of “topogenesis,” in order to
prove scientifically a link between nature and human beings.
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Furthermore the

pseudoscientific Russian discipline of geosophy claimed that human history was not
necessarily determined by their environment and geography but rather that geography and
human beings had a reciprocal relationship. Eurasianists contended that the soil could expose
a hidden meaning of past and future events. The subtle determinism of geosophy and Savitsky’s
theory of topogenesis attributed a mystical culture-forming aspect to land that aided in the
creation of national identities.
Despite the inability of the Eurasianists to indicate exactly what constituted the borders
of Eurasia, Savitsky and other Eurasianists claimed that the natural unity of the Eurasian
territory could be scientifically explained. They argued that Eurasia”…is the only country
whose flora, fauna, soil, and climate are so perfectly harmonious…” and that it represented as
yet an undiscovered natural law.73 Eurasia was composed of four horizontal botanical strips of
land and soil extending from east to west; taiga, tundra, desert and steppe. These strips of land
were intersected by three major plains: the Siberian plain, the Turkistan plain and the plain
from the White Sea to the Caucasus. This diverse geographic system demanded an array of
various methods for humans to sustain themselves be it through sedentary farming, hunting, or
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herding. Thus the geographic arrangement of Eurasia, according to Eurasianists, was a
manifestation Eurasia’s universal mission. The Russian steppe was perhaps the most important
of the types of land present in Eurasia. The steppe, spanning horizontally along much of Central
and East Asia across multiple civilizations, constituted Eurasia’s own “horizontal” mission.
The sheer scope of this geographic facet of Eurasia proved to the Eurasianists the inherent
expansionist character of Russia.
While the early Eurasian mythomoteur maintained that Russians and non-Russian
Eurasians were a historically-united community of destiny, some Eurasianist scholars also
attempted to unite the various peoples of Eurasia through cultural and linguistic approaches.
Of the Eurasianists only a few including Trubetzkoy believed that the Russian people were at
least somewhat related to the Slavs of the Balkans with their linguistic and religious
similarities. 74 Conversely, other Eurasianists emphasized that despite the linguistic links
between Russians and other Slavs, non-Russian Slavs belonged mostly to the RomanoGermanic cultural zone. The Russians, on the other hand, were part of a cultural zone that
included Finno-Urgic and Turkic peoples. Indeed, the Eurasianists maintained that genetic and
racial kinship was irrelevant to understanding identity; rather, what mattered was where a
culture or language was originally formed. Thus the theory of topogenesis put forward by
Savitsky maintained that geography was essential to understanding the evolution of cultures
and languages. The Russians, having developed their language in Eurasia, were exclusively a
Eurasian people.
Furthermore, the Eurasian peoples, linked as they were by geography and culture to one
another, also exhibited a linguistic unity. The linguist Roman Jakobson used three major criteria
to demonstrate a relative linguistic unity among the various Eurasian peoples; tone, correlation
of palatalization, and territorial continuity. Eurasia, according to Jakobson, was an area whose
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populace all spoke languages that lacked complex tone or palatalization. The various Eurasian
languages, admitted Jakobson, might not have originated near one another and might remain
diverse, but they were nonetheless evolving toward the same characteristics and shared the
same large geographical space.75 Again, the importance of geography and its effect on language
and culture to the early Eurasianists’ worldview was paramount.76
The early Eurasianists of the interwar period never formed a unified doctrine. They
were a collection of like-minded individuals who tended to be religious revolutionaries. They
saw Russia as the historically destined unifier of Eurasia and envisioned an empire bereft of
traditional monarchy as well as European parliamentary democracy and capitalism. They
remained, however, largely devoted to Orthodoxy while paying homage to Eurasia’s religious
diversity. The Eurasianists proposed something of an authoritarian conception of a new
Eurasian state, a diverse empire that represented a communal harmony between different
cultures and religions but nonetheless all devoted to a single central government. They
combined a romantic myth-symbol complex containing a cult of diversity with a mythomoteur
that defined the Russian nation as a destined unifier of a great empire. Despite their failure to
have an effect on the Soviet Union and their dispersal by the end of the Second World War, the
early Eurasianists were in part a precursor to Alexander Dugin’s own neo-Eurasianist
philosophy.
While the Eurasianists posited a largely religious and cultural definition of Russianness,
the ethnic theories of Lev Gumilev are an example of mythomoteur of the Russian nation that
is defined purely by a biological determinism and social Darwinism. His work is said by some
scholars such as Anton Shekhovtsov to have had a direct influence on the geopolitical theories
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of Alexander Dugin.77
Much of Gumilev’s life was marked by political dissidence. From praising anti-Stalinist
poetry to being implicated in a terrorist attack on a Leningrad party official, Gumilev was
arrested and imprisoned in the forced labor camps of the Gulag system multiple times. Despite
his history of arrests, he was able to become one of the most celebrated scholars in the Soviet
Union after Stalin’s death. Originally a scholar of East Asian history and culture who wrote
extensively on the Huns and Mongols, Gumilev eventually developed an interest in broader
questions of how societies and ethnicities develop and their relationship with one another.
Ultimately, Gumilev developed a theory of history and ethnicity that was said to transcend the
humanities, positing that human history could be predicted.78
In his book Ethnogensis and the Biosphere Gumilev presented an expansive
explanation of how civilizations such as the Mongols, having been seemingly quiet and calm
for so long, erupted into a great frenzy of activity, conquering huge swathes of land and ruling
other civilizations only to collapse just as suddenly. His answer to this question was what he
called “passionarity.” This phenomenon, determined largely by natural forces such as the
undulation of solar radiation levels, gives great bursts of activity and inspiration to certain
peoples depending on where they live on the globe.79 This passionarity leads to bursts of artistic
and architectural achievements as well as to the creation of great empires. Ethnic groups,
hithero seen by outsiders as mostly isolated and unassuming, in a burst of passionarity were
able to form complex state systems and advanced military technologies to defeat and conquer
their neighbors. 80 Each ethnic group can then be seen as vessels of individuals who are
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themselves vessels of the ethnic group’s potential for passionarity; such individuals include
Napoleon Bonaparte, Alexander the Great, and Genghis Khan. The ethnic group, what Gumilev
called the “ethnos,” then, was a biological and organic entity that could be observed as
collective whole. However, individuals and great leaders within the ethnos represent a sort of
soul or spirit of the rest of the ethnos and led it to do great things.81 They are fundamentally
unconscious bearers of the ethnos’ greater will.
According to Gumilev, it is a scientific reality that each ethnic group has a prescribed
lifespan from 1,200 to 1,500 years.82 Once an ethnic group emerged, it went through a series
of pre-determined life stages not unlike the life stages of a human being. Ethnogenesis is
divided into several life stages; the first three hundred years of an ethnos’ life is its early
“childhood.” After that, another three hundred years of adolescence characterizes the second
stage. Thirdly, the ethnos goes through one hundred and fifty years of conquest. After that,
there is six hundred years of consolidation in which the ethnos acquires an ideological
foundation and a reliance on technology but dies spiritually and internally. The final two stages
of an ethnos’ lifespan are characterized by a gradual decline and the extinction of the group or
it becoming a sort of “relic” like the Australian aborigines.83 Thus human history was largely
pre-determined by biological and solar factors.
Placing the theory of ethnogenesis into a historical context, Gumilev’s historiography
resembles that of the interwar Eurasianists. Like the Eurasianists, he saw Russia as a
constitutive part of a larger Eurasian identity. He believed that during the sixteenth centuries
the Russians, Mongols and Tatars came together to form a larger ethnic group, or a super-ethnos.
One thousand years prior to the formation of the Eurasian super-ethnos a Latin-Germanic
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super-ethnos was formed in Western Europe which came to represent a constant threat to the
Eurasian one. While one current in Russian historiography praises Russia for defeating the
Mongols and thus saving the rest of Christendom, Gumilev emphasized that it was rather
fortuitous that the Mongols had invaded Russia which was then protected and insulated from a
Western invasion. Like the early Eurasianists, Gumilev praised the Mongols of the Golden
Horde, maintaining that their religious tolerance allowed the Russians to maintain their organic
ties with Orthodox Christianity. 84 The Mongol period is described as a healthy symbiotic
relationship between the Russians and the Mongols. The period served to protect and strengthen
the Russian ethnos. However, according to Gumilev, once the Golden Horde adopted Islam it
attached itself to another super-ethnos, an Islamic one. Thus, the Russians became heir to an
empire of the Steppes. Marlene Laruelle correctly notes that this represents one of the many
contradictions within Gumilev’s theory of ethnogenesis.85 If ethnogenesis is a fundamentally
biological process that can be scientifically observed, then how can the inclusion and exclusion
of an ethnos into a super-ethnos be based on the assumption of a new faith? Moreover,
Gumilev’s ideas on the positive results of Russian mixing with Turks and Mongols throughout
history only go so far. Whereas the Eurasianists were content with the idea of Russians having
a biological blood tie to Mongols and other Asian peoples, Gumilev stressed the importance of
keeping ethnic groups biologically separated and championed endogamy. With interbreeding
came the dilution of the gene pool and the ethnos’ potential passionarity. This biological
sentiment was quite unlike the Eurasiansts’ own romantic sentiments concerning the
relationship between Russia and its neighbors.
Despite the contradictions within his own historiosophy when taking into account his
theory of ethnogenesis, Gumilev’s conception of Russian nationhood largely resembles that of
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the Eurasianists. Both espouse a belief that the Russian nation, be it through a community of
destiny or a deterministic cultural fusion of Russian and Central Asian ethnic groups, is only
authentically realized as part of a larger whole. Both the Eurasianists and Gumilev professed a
belief in the supremacy of the organic community over individuals throughout history. In
addition, both Eurasianists and Gumilev completely rejected a European identity for Russia,
and rather emphasized that Russia was a category unto itself that embraced an Eastern heritage
more than a Western one.
In approaching both interwar Eurasianism and the theories espoused by Lev Gumilev,
it is easy to see the similarities between them and the work of Alexander Dugin. All three
espouse a belief in the uniqueness of a communitarian Russia. Furthermore Eurasianism as
well as Gumilev and Dugin see the expansion of Russian territory as natural and desirable –
even pre-destined. Thirdly, all three see the West, or at least many of the ideas produced there,
as a threat to Russia. The main point of divergence between the three set of ideas is the question
of race. While the Eurasianists and Dugin, as will be discussed later, define the Eurasian
community in largely religious or cultural terms, Gumilev unequivocally maintains a racial
view of man. Indeed, Gumilev’s historical philosophy can be seen as a case for biological
determinism that leaves little room for God or spirituality. Unlike Dugin’s ideas, Gumilev’s
theories are scientifically reductionist in their argument that an ethnic group’s actions and
history are essentially predetermined by their level of passionarity.
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2.1 The European New Right

On May 21, 2013 the French right-wing historian Dominque Venner committed suicide.
In the midst of around 1,500 other people in and around the Notre Dame Cathedral, he shot
himself at its altar. A determined opponent to the recent legalization of gay marriage and a
vehement activist against the influx of non-European immigrants to France, Venner believed
that only through a violent and shocking display could he awaken the French masses from their
apathy.86 A historian and political activist, Venner worked with Alain de Benoist along with
other members of the far right. The shocking suicide let to an outpour of sentiment from
politicians and thinkers of the right. Marine le Pen, the leader of the Front Nationale, a socially
conservative and nationalist party, and the rightist academic Bruno Gollnisch expressed their
deepest sympathies. Less than twenty-four hours after Venner’s suicide, however, the feminist
group Femen staged a mock suicide at the cathedral; a topless demonstration with “may fascists
rest in hell” written on their chests.87
Venner’s suicide represents only one instance of a call to action that has resonated in
much of the post-war right. Disparaging of liberal democracy and decrying what they see as
the homogenization of particular European identities, members of the far right throughout the
Western world have been calling for a complete transformation of the global order. Against
American global hegemony, consumerism and multiculturalism they propose a multi-polar
world that would mean the end of American cultural and political influence. Despite a generally
agreed-upon platform of what they are against, the contemporary far right is deeply fragmented.
Some on the far right are no more than isolated would-be terrorists who maintain that the only
way to affect real change is through violent action against the state, political opponents, and
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immigrants. Others such as the Greek political party Golden Dawn utilize Nazi paraphernalia
such as the swastika and Hitler salute to shock spectators. Still others, however, follow a more
cautious and long-term approach to competing for political power. Described by many
observers as the New Right, this group is composed of academics and intellectuals who are
critics of liberalism and modernity. Inspired by the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci, they
have appropriated his approach to gaining power by attempting to participate in a new type of
politics. While many political and interest groups attempt to gain power through elections or
even sometimes force, the New Right maintains that the only way to affect real change is by
gaining cultural hegemony by changing the values of elites through educational and media
institutions. Thus the European New Right’s fundamental strategy is borrowed from the left.
One of the most important intellectual organs of the New Right is the Groupement de
Recherche et d'Etudes pour la Civilisation Européenne or the Research and Study Group for
European Civilization (GRECE). Founded in 1968 by the writer and journalist Alain de Benoist,
it is a religious and nationalist think tank that has been the most important venue for far right
discourse for the past half century. Founded by forty individuals from separate nationalist and
dissident groups, GRECE formed a discourse that has challenged contemporary accepted
political and social norms and formed a stage upon which other like-minded rightists could
participate through their journals Éléments and Nouvelle École. Intellectuals of the European
New Right have for the past decades participated in multiple conferences and debates,
platforms in which intellectuals from different countries can participate. As early as 1992,
Alexander Dugin and Alain de Benoist have had a cordial relationship. While never always in
full agreement with Benoist, Dugin’s own journal was clearly inspired by Benoist’s Éléments.
One of the means by which the European New Right has sought to overturn what it
perceives to be the apathy of European peoples concerning globalization and the loss of
individual cultures’ particularities is through spiritual revival. However, while many of the far
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right, particularly the reactionary right, have usually championed Christianity as Europe’s
traditional religion, many New Rightists denounce Christianity as one of the chief problems of
contemporary Western society. Rather, many among the New Right look to the revival of
ancient European paganism with its vitalism and cult of masculinity as one of the only means
of restoring Europe’s sense of self. The New Right’s hostility towards Christianity can be
explained by examining its historiosophy, how it emplots European history and how they
conceptualizes time.
According to the New Right the natural religion of the European peoples is paganism.
Various tribes worshipped different gods and practiced different rites. Nonetheless, all the preChristian tribal religions shared a reverence for nature, heroism, and believed that “life has no
purpose other than itself.” 88 Furthermore, they believed in the cyclical nature of time and
peoples; like the seasons peoples and eras go through an endless cycle of birth, death, and
rebirth. The numerous European pagan practices prior to the advent of Christianity, then,
contained a cult of action and a morality system that allowed for shades of grey rather than
absolute criteria in appraising right and wrong. Truth to the pagan was not a universal truth,
and what was good and what was evil was not an objective reality, but subjective and dependent
on many variables. Furthermore, the gods of a particular tribe or nation were just that; theirs.
European pagans had no use for evangelical missions or holy wars. Accordingly, the New Right
asserts, paganism was given to more nuance than Christianity is, and Europe’s traditional
religions were thus more open-minded and tolerant of other peoples and ways of life.
The New Right argues that truth and morality were subjective ideas to European pagans,
and it was not necessary to reify those concepts. However, how one conducted oneself was not
subjective. No matter what the circumstance the pre-Christian pagan always valued honor,
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loyalty, and heroism and disparaged cowardice.89 Figures such as Alain de Benoist contend that
paganism was a religion of works, not one of faith. Even with the introduction of Christianity
the European peoples were only converted after a combination of bribery, torture, and trickery.
Ultimately, the only way that Christianity could take hold in Europe was through adaptation to
the European situation, depicting Christ not as a fallen god but focused on the resurrected aspect
of Christ, seeing him as a god of victory.90
Just like Nietzsche, Alain de Benoist sees Christianity’s more or less dominance of
European culture as nothing less than “catastrophic.”91 For him, it is the cause of the unrealistic
egalitarian universalism seen in both Marxism and liberalism that has led to the deracination
and slow death of European civilization. Christianity, an oriental “desert religion” was and
remains an alien religion opposed to the vitality and life-affirming spirituality of European
forest dwellers. Christianity represents nothing less than the complete dismantlement of the
European spirit and is ultimately a totalitarian doctrine. New Rightists maintain that
Christianity’s disastrous consequences can be seen throughout European history all the way to
the mass murders and gulag system of the Soviet Union. Christianity’s conceptualization of
time and history, that existence had a definite starting point and a fixed, divinely determined
end point has doomed the European peoples to a false sense of reality. Mono-linear time, as
opposed to pagan ideas of cyclical time, then, creates a narrative of progress which maintains
that eventually the whole world will be led into a utopia; Christ’s millennial reign. In addition
to its opposition to Christianity’s sense of progress and time, the New Right argues against
Christianity’s metaphysical dualism. Maintaining that European paganism valued diversity
through its variety of tribal deities and its lack of evangelical spirit, the New Right claims that
Christianity changed the way Europeans thought about reality. Christianity introduced a
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stringent definition of the truth; questions of morality were seen in shades of black and white
with seldom any nuance. 92 By cutting themselves off from their pagan roots, Christian
Europeans began to believe in the equality of all souls before God, and similarly, believed in
an evangelizing mission to convert all souls to a one true God.93 This “Bolshevism of Antiquity,”
according to the New Right, would later be secularized and utilized for other universal
missions.94
The New Right has created a historical narrative that holds the advent of Christianity
and its direct epistemological effects on the formation of modern ideologies such as liberalism
and Marxism as directly responsible for what it sees as the slow death of particularism today.
In short, they argue that the Late Middle Ages was the last time traditional pagan virtues held
any real influence on European civilization. During this period, the pagan ideals of a warrior
king, honor and loyalty were still ensconced in the popular ideals of chivalry and divinely
ordained kingship. However, the Reformation marked the final blow to European paganism.
With the rise of first Lutheranism and then other forms of Protestantism, Christianity as a whole
unwittingly let loose the floodgates to skepticism, which led to the necessity to tolerate
individual interpretations of the Bible, spiritual ennui and finally secularism. This secularism
manifested itself initially as a new societal focus on science. Renaissance humanism gave way
to an increasingly rationalistic approach to the world. The natural world then became
“…measured, analyzed and rendered into the language of mathematics.” 95 Eventually,
rationalism was utilized as a universal model to be applied to society and the state. Rationalism
became a part of the discourse of revolutionaries of what would later be known as the “left,”
which sought overturn centuries-old traditions and hierarchies.
Since the seventeenth century, according to the New Right, science and rationalism
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have effectively replaced spiritual values and tradition as the legitimizing ideas behind
authority and statehood. The rise of capitalism, intellectually justified by Protestantism and
rationalism, combined with further religious dissolution and the centralizing tendencies of
monarchs to create new societies. The new model of the state was created in order to maximize
administrative efficiency and economic profit, regardless of a culturally-specific common good.
This secular rationalism was manifested in the liberalism of the eighteenth century and the
French revolution. Positing a secular universalism, liberalism and later Marxism declared their
materialistic doctrines to be universally applicable and historically determined.96 Furthermore,
the false narrative of eternal progress present in liberalism and Marxism both foster a culture
of “liberation,” which according to the New Right, strives towards ever-more spurious
“liberations.” Starting with an emancipation from God or the divine, liberalism has created a
culture in which ethnic, cultural, and gender identities, once considered natural and inherent to
the individual, are easily taken up and discarded at will in the name of a postmodern cult of
individualism.
The New Right, embodied in GRECE, is also deeply critical of contemporary
conceptions of democracy. In place of what they see as an American-centric idea of democracy
that is used as a universal model, they argue for a diversity of government types, maintaining
that different peoples require different forms of government. In The Problem of Democracy,
Benoist argues for an ethnic understanding of the history of democracy. He maintains that
democratic tendencies among pre-modern peoples such as Athenian Greeks and Norse
Icelanders were founded upon a common rootedness. Citizenship and participation in politics
was a manifestation of their belonging to a common homeland and sharing a common
background, thus endowing them with common interests.97 In essence, there was a “cultural
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cohesion” in Athens and other city-states.98 Sharing common interests, values, myths, histories
and a shared homeland, the peoples of the Greek city-states were able to effectively administer
themselves democratically while still respecting hierarchy and tradition. In contrast, the
modern democratic process is organized around atomized individuals selfishly competing for
personal interests with no regard for the greater community.99 Indeed, contemporary European
countries such as France and the United Kingdom, inundated as they are with foreign
immigrants no longer represent societies for which the first iteration of democracy was meant
for.
Seeing in Europe a crisis of identity and a threat to its survival, the European New Right
has created a fundamentally new mythomoteur and myth-symbol complex to articulate a
European identity. Opposed to what they see as the universalism of Christianity that has
manifested itself in virtually all left-wing projects, GRECE has created a pre-Christian mythsymbol complex that extolls the virtues of a diverse European paganism. Utilizing mostly
Norse mythological symbols, images of Odin, ravens, and runes have become an important
component of the New Right’s call for Europeans to revert back to their ancestral roots.100
Paradoxically, the New Right has utilized a narrative of pre-Christian Europe’s religious
diversity to unite culturally disparate peoples into a supra-national identity. Furthermore, the
GRECE mythomoteur uses a fall-redemption narrative that details an idealized pagan Europe
that has been duped or forced into accepting culture-killing Christianity and its inevitably
totalitarian ideologies of Marxism and liberalism. Embodied by the rootless and mercantile
United States, Europe has been subjected to a slow spiritual and ethnic death. Only through the
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revitalization of its sense of self through pagan spirituality and an appreciation of their common
history can European peoples unite under a federal system that defends their particularities
against the vagaries of modernity.
Today the New Right is not only represented by GRECE members but a diverse group
of thinkers largely in Europe as well as North America. Communicating through online
webzines, podcasts and journals, they all share a deep distrust of modern society and American
hegemony as well as a profound dislike of multiculturalism. While some such as Benoist call
for a resurrection of Europe’s Pagan past, others are more comfortable remaining with
Christianity. Still others like Alexander Dugin, inspired by the extreme anti-modernism of
Julius Evola and other Traditionalists, have turned to the reactionary doctrine of Traditionalism
in an attempt to exorcise the modern demons of contemporary Western society.
On the surface, Neo-Eurasianism as espoused by Dugin is another example of Russian
nationalist nostalgia. For some, the Russian Empire of the nineteenth century and before
represented a golden age of traditional Russian values. For others, the Soviet Union was the
ideal guarantor of Soviet, and thus Russian, great power status. Dugin is indeed nostalgic.
However, while Dugin truly mourns the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, likening Russia to
Germany right after the First World War, his expansionist project utilizes neither Tsarist nor
Soviet symbols.101 Rather, Dugin mourns the tragedy of what he sees as a truly global loss.
Modernity and liberalism, he argues, have deprived humanity of its connection to the sacred,
and have stripped many cultures of their natural, divinely-ordained traditions, religions, and
hierarchies. His ideas are fundamentally grounded in a genuine belief in a Perennial Tradition
as articulated by René Guénon and Julius Evola.
Some scholars, such as Marlene Laruelle and Edith Clowes have argued for a more
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ethnic or even racial understanding of Dugin’s type of nationalism. He does, after all, maintain
that Russians are perhaps the most important part of any Eurasianist project and utilizes much
of the same language that interwar German racists and Aryan supremacists used. However, it
is imperative to place Dugin’s ideas within his religious worldview. Dugin’s religious outlook
is the most important part of his intellectual makeup. It separates him from the primarily
Orthodox early Eurasianists and Gumilev’s racial and biological conception of nationhood and
other forms of Russian nationalism. Instead, Dugin approaches nationhood through a mystical
prism that posits that nations are defined by participation in a culture’s traditional religion and
sacred geography. His Traditionalist worldview can be seen in what he calls The Fourth
Political Theory and his mystical geopolitical theories.
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Chapter 3: Perennial Traditionalism and Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism

Perennial Traditionalism is a religious philosophy that maintains that most of the
world’s religions share a single universal truth which is the foundation for all religious
knowledge. As a worldview that allows for diverse representations of that truth, it can be said
to characterize many religious and political dissidents of the twentieth century who saw in
modernity a universal fall from grace. The origins of the idea of a Perennial Tradition can be
traced to the Renaissance era. Martin Sedgwick’s work, Against the Modern World:
Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century, points out that the
term philosophia perennis (Perennial Philosophy) was used in 1540 by a Catholic scholar to
explain one of the main ideas proposed by Marsilio Ficino.102 Ficino believed that the revival
of Plato and his ideas as an object of discussion was a gift from God to offer philosophical
arguments for Christianity. Ficino, then, elevated Plato beside Christianity as having equal
authority as both were “lawful” religions.103
According to Ficino, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Judaism and native pagan religions
all shared a spiritual lineage dating back to a foundational spiritual truth.104 This spiritual truth
was founded on the alleged discovery of theological writings supposedly written by Hermes
Trismegistus, a mythical ancient pagan thought to be a contemporary of Moses. Trismegistus
also supposedly practiced a belief in a universal truth as well as alchemy, which further helped
Ficino popularize his belief in a perennial philosophy.105 His writings, later discovered to be
forgeries, were translated by Ficino. They provided a means of religious syncretism; the rites
of paganism, Jewish Kabballah, and later Islam and Hinduism were practiced by religious
Traditionalists who saw them all as expressions of a larger universal and divine truth.
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Traditionalism as a syncretic religious belief has survived in various forms through secret
societies and occult ideologies into the twenty first-century.
In an interview on May 17, 2014 with Open Revolt a North American-based
organization that supports Alexander Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory, Dugin explained his
intellectual background;
“…In my early youth I was deeply inspired by Traditionalism of Rene Guenon and
Julius Evola. That was my definitive choice of camp – on the side of sacred Tradition against
the modern (and post-modern) world. This choice and all consequences are still there in the
present. I firmly stand for spiritual and religious values against actual decadent materialist and
perverted culture. Traditionalism was and rests central as the philosophic focus of all my later
developments.”106
René Guénon was the first major Traditionalist thinker of the first half of the twentieth
century. An Indologist who sought to prove Hinduism’s Traditional origins, Guénon was deeply
pessimistic about the course of Western civilization. Modernity, Guénon argued, postulated a
false narrative of progress that was typified by democracy and Marxism. However according
to Guénon the modern age was actually a dark age of humanity – what Hindus called the Kali
Yuga.107 Guénon believed that prior to the advent of modernity and its hedonistic individualism
individuals and society were closer to a universal god through a society’s local religious
tradition. Correct, divinely-ordained traditions of hierarchy, proper gender relations, and
humility were established. Modernity with its secularism and emphasis on rationalism and
egalitarianism had effectively severed much of humanity’s connection to the divine. He
stressed the “initiatic” potential of Traditionalism.108 Only through the proper initiation of an
individual into Tradition, drawing on rituals and doctrine that still maintained a fragment of the
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Perennial Tradition, could an individual begin to find his way back to the divine. However,
Western society, being the birthplace of modernity, was also the least likely to recover spiritual
authenticity – particularly due to Christianity having been largely subjugated by modernity.
Rather, Guénon called on Eastern religions, whose connection to the Perennial Tradition had
as of yet not been sullied by modern rationalism to bring salvation to the West and save Western
civilization.109 Although he eventually converted to Sufi Islam and lived out his life in Egypt,
Guénon for a time believed that Hinduism was the religion through which the West could
rediscover its connection to Tradition.
Especially appealing to Guénon and later, Julius Evola, was the strict hierarchical nature
of Hinduism. Julius Evola was a philosopher who also dabbled in magic and alchemy which
he considered a Traditional pre-modern science. 110 Evola envisioned a largely mythic preChristian Europe in a world in which authority and the divine were indivisible. In his famous
work, Revolt Against the Modern World, Evola claimed that kingship and aristocracy were
divinely sanctioned and necessary for any society to function. A tribal chief or king’s central
role was to be a conduit to the divine and thus his “primary and essential function consisted in
performing those ritual and sacrificial actions that constituted the center of gravity of all
life…”111 For such a king, Traditional life was a global reality: From the Far Eastern concept
of “the son of Heaven” to the deification of Roman emperors and the pre-modern Christian
belief in divine kingship, authority was enshrined as a natural and sacred facet of human
relations. A king or ruler was also a high priest and functioned as a conduit to the celestial.
Thus for Evola authority had a metaphysical nature and temporal power proceeded from its
spiritual authority.112
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Although Evola eventually became an advocate for Europe’s return to its own pagan
beliefs, the syncretic nature of Traditionalism allowed him to draw heavily on other religions,
particularly Hinduism. In early Hinduism, Evola saw a society in which caste, hierarchy,
religious rites and natural forms of authority were supreme over individualism and materialism.
Invoking what he saw as a mythical, masculine and sacred tradition, Hinduism was one of the
few religions remaining that had kept a measure of its Traditional truth. Furthermore, like many
non-monotheist religions Hinduism approached time as cyclical. For Evola, existence and
civilizations go through endless cycles of birth, growth, aging, death and rebirth. Accordingly,
just like Guénon, Evola saw the modern world as going through a stage of Kali Yuga, in which
discord, chaos, and vice reign supreme.
Evola was a contemporary of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini who preached a
mystical ideology that combined a doctrine of political elitism, masculine aristocracy, and
Perennial Traditionalism.113 An early supporter of both Italian Fascism and National Socialism,
he nonetheless grew weary of both ideologies. This was because Evola ultimately believed that
while fascism and National Socialism made important strides in reinvigorating Europe with a
cult of action, neither ideology fostered a truly Traditional spirituality. Rather, both movements
were far too populist and, despite the apparent attempts by the Nazi Reich to form a new elite
class of warriors such as the SS, did not do enough to foster a truly aristocratic principle.114
Furthermore, Evola was deeply disappointed with Nazism’s biological determinism and
racism. Indeed, an important note must be made concerning Evola, the history of Nazism and
the subject of race. Evola certainly espoused a fundamentally anti-Semitic worldview. However,
an essential distinction that must be made is that Evola was principally against what he called
“Semitic thought.” 115 That is ideas such as egalitarianism, materialism, and secularism
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entertained by many Jews as well as those who had a similar “Semitic” mentality. Countering
the “Semitic” mentality was an “Aryan” mindset that valued honor, loyalty, hierarchy and
tradition. Race to Evola was not the biological or ethnic substance of a group of people, but
rather was a spiritual phenomenon. While ethnic groups carried a “memory” of a spiritual race,
there was nothing inherently noble or superior about an Aryan man. Rather, only by adopting
the values of an Aryan mindset could someone become an Aryan. Simply because a man came
from Nordic stock did not necessarily mean he was “Aryan” of spirit.116 Indeed, he scoffed at
the idea that a contemporary German street sweeper would consider himself better than an
African king purely on the basis of his white skin.117 Indeed, Jews could be spiritually superior
to many non-Jews. While Hitler’s definition of Aryan largely included those only of a
Germanic ethnic background, Evola maintained that Hitler himself was not Aryan as he was a
demagogue and populist.
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“proletarianized” and accepted only a “completely plebeian” concept of race.119 Opposed to
ethnic anti-Semitism, Evola argued that the primary indicator of human character was not racial
or genetic makeup, but rather a person’s spiritual life and outlook.120 Therefore in Evola’s
writings an “Aryan” or “Jew” should not be understood as purely biological entities, “but as
categories denoting ‘typical attitudes which were not necessarily present in all individuals of
Aryan or Jewish blood.’”121 This is not to say that Evola’s ideas were not deeply wrong, but
his distinction between spiritual and biological race allows for the possibility for someone like
Dugin to read Evola’s ideas on race as primarily religious and otherworldly, rather than
biological.
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Like Evola, Dugin fears that contemporary society exists in the Kali Yuga. In his 2001
manifesto of the Eurasianist Movement, Dugin decried a fallen world in which totalitarian
uniformity and consumerism are the only hallmarks of the modern life.122 Additionally angered
by the seeming political and ideological apathy of the masses, he wrote, “The majority of
political parties and formalized social movements pursue tactical purposes. Practically nowhere
can be found an explicit and consequent ideology capable to snatch man from a state of sleepy
indifference, to make life worth living.”123
For Dugin, this philosophical ennui has been largely fostered by the victory of American
liberal democracy and Americanization of the cultures of the world, which he describes as an
“Atlanticist tsunami.” 124 In addition to what he sees as the death of ideology, Dugin also
mourns the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which he regards an unmitigated disaster. The end
of the Soviet Union meant the effective end of organized opposition to globalization and
Americanization. However, rather than a restoration of the Soviet Union Dugin proposes a new
political union, a Eurasian one. A Eurasianist empire would stretch into territories and countries
that neither the Russian Empire nor the Soviet Union had ever ruled over. The Eurasianist
movement represents a supranational project that will unite many different religions and ethnic
groups into a single empire. On the surface, Dugin’s geopolitical vision appears to be driven
by a desire for the maximization of Russian power and influence. To some extent, that is correct.
However, pregnant within Dugin’s territorial ambitions for a Eurasianist empire are Traditional
ideas of sacred space as well as a new ideological model of identity. The model incorporates
ideas of both civilization and the spiritual missions of peoples as constitutive facets of identity.
The Eurasianist project ultimately posits a new mythomoteur for Russians by portraying Russia
as an important “glue” to a greater Eurasian empire, thus fulfilling its divinely-ordained
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mission – to be a uniter of peoples.
Dugin’s arguments for a civilizational model of history discussed in his The Fourth
Political Theory are not purely made for the strengthening of Russian state power. Rather, his
definition of the Russian nation and its role within a greater Eurasian civilization are
determined by his esoteric belief in the Perennial Tradition. Dugin’s definition of Russian
nationhood is fundamentally spiritual. Indeed, Dugin has often repeated his disagreement with
racism and the notion of race itself. Rather, he posits that the Russian nation is and must be
defined as a spiritually-rooted people practicing Orthodoxy as it remains one of the few
Christian traditions that have held on to some Traditional truth. He argues, “Russians should
realize that they are Orthodox in the first place.”125 Furthermore, Russians, like all other nations,
are represented by angels. According to Dugin’s Traditionalism, these “national angels”
determine the character of individual nations and are representatives of “God’s thought.”126
Russia is depicted as an “integration angel;” a divine unifying essence that collects other
national angels into a “universal imperial” project that protects the individuality of each of the
angels. 127 Conversely, the Anglo-Saxon West opposes it with its own type of angel called
“mammon,” a god of greed.128 Thus utilizing a Traditional myth-symbol complex grounded in
esoteric theology and Orthodoxy, Dugin is attempting to create a new identity for the Russian
nation based on Traditional, not ethnic criteria.
Taken as a whole, Dugin’s blueprint for a Eurasian empire could lead to nothing but
enormous amounts of strife and bloodshed as the map is redrawn and empires are carved out.
It is a fundamental manifestation of an apocalyptic worldview that sees an inevitable armed
conflict between two spiritual forces, one represented by Western mercantilism, individualism
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and rationalism and the other by Eastern spirituality, rootedness, and organic community. Thus,
while Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics is a cynical and dangerous manifesto, it is also a
representation of his own mystical Traditional worldview embodied by how he and other
Traditionalists have understood the sacral nature of geography.
In Traditionalism and other esoteric belief systems, geography has often conveyed
important symbolic and spiritual meanings. Accordingly, the location of a space often bore a
transcendent essence that manifested itself in the land’s occupants. Julius Evola in particular
articulated a vision of history according to sacred space. Indeed, it is Evola’s ideas and their
espousal by Alexander Dugin that have caused scholars such as Laruelle to see a racist
component in Dugin’s body of thought. Evola applied similar ideas similar to those of the
vehemently racist and anti-Semitic Ariosophists of the interwar period in Germany. Typified
by individuals such as Guido von List and Lanz von Liebenfels, Ariosophists combined esoteric
mysticism and racism to articulate their version of world history. In brief, many Ariosophists
believed, in some way or another, in the divinity of Aryan man and that the Aryan people had
recently been subjected to racial miscegenation and moral decay through the advent of
effeminizing democracy.129 Many of them believed that the Aryan people originated in lands
to the far north, sometimes called Thule or Hyperborea. Before being poisoned by modern
democracy, the Aryans had brought culture to the world and a natural order based on racial
castes.130
Evola maintained that during a remote prehistoric golden age, a great northern Arctic
homeland of wise people had once existed known as Hyperborea. A “spiritual disaster” led to
a major tilt in the Earth’s axis, which forced the Hyperborean people to flee. They left for North
America and northern Siberia, and later to a now lost continent of Atlantis in the middle of the
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Atlantic Ocean, eventually spreading to South America and places in Africa, and Asia; thus
peoples who carried on a “Northern” spirituality existed all around the globe. A key aspect of
Evola’s Traditionalist thought was his conception of “Northern” and “Southern” spiritual
features in the various peoples of the world. “Northern” peoples tended to embody a religious,
masculine and Traditional understanding of nature. Conversely, “Southern” spirituality,
associated with the moon and femininity, was largely decadent, materialistic and democratic.131
However, this was not an entirely ethnic distinction; “Southern” peoples could embrace a
“Northern” spirituality and vice versa.
Dugin has also utilized the image of Hyperborea in his writings. His publishing house,
Arctogaia is named after a mythic Arctic continent inspired by the imagery of the interwar
Ariosophists.

132

However, like Evola, he analyzes the Hyperborean myth through a

Traditionalist viewpoint. Nevertheless Dugin has also argued for a spiritual understanding of
geography. He maintains that ultimately the secrets of the universe can be unlocked by
engaging in Traditional sciences. In his essay From Sacred Geography to Geopolitics, Dugin
describes his geopolitical “science” as a necessarily modern rendition of a Traditional science,
sacred geography. Just as alchemy, a sacred art used in Traditional rituals, has become
desacralized through chemistry, so too has modern geopolitics become a profane study that
does not grasp the essential spiritual struggle that exists in the modern world. 133 He
characterizes this struggle as an ancient struggle between the Thalassocracy and Tellurocracy.
The former, according to Dugin, can be identified today by its practice of a “southern”
spirituality. It is exemplified by modern liberalism, rationalism, individualism, consumerism
and metropolitanism, and is embodied by the United States and its allies. Conversely, the
Tellurocracy can be identified by its rootedness, spirituality and religion, community, and
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hierarchy and is embodied by most of the Eurasian peoples, in particular the Russians who are
heirs to the spiritual truths passed down from Hyperborea. 134 The sacred meaning of the
cardinal direction of where a civilization is located also helps determine its character. As the
United States is Western, it is a “country of death” in which the sun, symbolic of Perennial
Tradition, goes to set.135 On the other hand, the East is “the Land of the Spirit,” an “Eden”
where the sun ascends.136
Alexander Dugin’s beliefs about sacred geography and lost continents are truly bizarre.
However, they are a manifestation of how deeply embedded his belief in the Perennial Tradition
is. While Laruelle is correct to point out that Evola and Dugin both use a similar type of
narrative to that of the Ariosophists, it is important to remember that Dugin and Evola approach
the idea of Hyperborea through a specifically spiritual, not biological, prism. As Nicholas
Goodrick points out, “Evola tended to see ‘spirituality’ as the prior determinant of a culture
rather than its ethnic, racial population.” 137 Thus, when Evola speaks of Hyperborea he is
appraising it as a prehistorical font of spiritual wisdom and Tradition, not the homeland of a
biologically superior race. In the same vein, Dugin uses the idea of Hyperborea in his mythsymbol complex not to denote Russia and its “Northern-ness” as the Aryan heirs to racial
supermen, but rather as the heirs to a primordial Perennial Tradition.
For this reason Dugin has repeatedly come under attack by contemporary New Rightists
and American white nationalists who have hitherto seen Dugin as a racial ally against
multiculturalism, liberalism, and globalization. Contrary to some New Rightists who are
simultaneously avowed Traditionalists and racists, Dugin has repeatedly argued against
biological race as a meaningful factor in understanding culture, politics or history. The
contemporary New Right is not a monolith. Rather, it is a conglomeration of groups and
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individual thinkers who engage in a Gramscian strategy of metapolitics. They generally agree
on an anti-American, anti-egalitarian, and anti-materialist outlook on the world. Furthermore,
they propose an “Identitarian” project aimed at protecting individual ethnic cultures from
cultural homogenization.138 Yet the movement is rife with internal conflicts, ranging from how
they should adjust their metapolitical strategy over time to what the world would look like if
the New Right actually gained the cultural hegemony it pursues. Furthermore, the New Right
can largely be considered racist, or in the very least as a philosophy that believes race is a
biologically important, even supreme, factor in understanding human society. However,
recently some thinkers, including Benoist himself, have come under fire for doctrinal impurity,
particularly by American New Rightists. Furthermore, by discussing the debates present within
New Right discourse, we can more fully grasp Dugin’s own stance on race by examining the
criticisms levelled at him by open biological racists.
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Chapter 4: Dugin, Race and the Racist New Right

In New Culture, New Right the White Nationalist Michael O’Meara decries what he
considers to be a blatant step backwards in the movement’s metapolitical struggle. Up until
1998, GRECE emphatically opposed any attempts by the authorities to confer legal status to
North African immigrants as a separate legal category on the grounds that this action would
threaten France’s identity. 139 However, GRECE reversed course by adopting a more
“communitarian” approach which favored the public recognition of non-French communities
in order to facilitate the survival of the non-French immigrants’ culture.140 Thus, according to
O’Meara, began a series of intellectual retreats in which the French Nouvelle Droite began to
exchange its original attempts at gaining cultural hegemony by diluting its ideas in favor of a
much humbler mission of simply “interpreting” the present.141 By not continuing with the call
for the expulsion of the non-European immigrants, according to the more determined New
Rightists, Benoist and GRECE essentially gave up much of their racial nationalism for a
“communitarian qualified multiculturalism.”142
Correspondingly, Guillamme Faye wrote his book Why We Fight as a reaction to what
he saw as the weakening resolve of GRECE.143 In the work, Faye rails against the “system
friendly” intellectuals of the right who only claim to have the best interests of the white race in
mind.144 He goes on to argue that the contemporary decadence of the French government,
which he characterizes as a “multi-racialist mafia,” will lead to “genetic ruin” for all of
Europe.145
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Despite Dugin’s protestations of good faith towards similarly-minded New Rightists,
others within the movement do not consider him a member. In an interview with Open Revolt,
Dugin argued that while he accepts White Nationalists only as common short-term allies
against unipolarity and liberalism, he recognizes differences of opinion with them:
“More than this, I can’t defend Whites when they are in opposition to non-Whites
because, being White and Indo-European myself, I recognize the differences of other ethnic
groups as being a natural thing, and do not believe in any hierarchy among peoples, because
there is not and cannot be any common, universal measure by which to measure and compare
the various forms of ethnic societies or their value systems.”146
In the article, “The Magic Disillusion of a Nationalist Intellectual,” Dugin talks about
what he calls the “myth of the solidarity of a single white race.”147 In it he described the belief
in a single, unitary white or Aryan race as a “utopia that could only lead to the Holocaust of the
Jews…” as well as the Slavs.148 He continues,

“The remains of the Third Reich are a basis for this miserable, contradictory and
completely false conception. The Anglo-Saxon world is one sociopolitical and cultural reality.
The inhabitants of Central Europe are something different. The Eastern world of Orthodox
Christianity and Slavs is a third reality. I am certain that many non-white peoples of Eurasia
are a thousandfold closer to us in spirit and culture than Americans. In this question I am 100%
affirmative with the visions of [Lev] Gumilev.”149

With this statement Dugin not only asserts that race is not a meaningful factor in categorizing
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peoples but also proposes an ethno-cultural interpretation of Gumilev’s theories, rather than a
biological one. Yet again, Dugin attacked race as a defining factor in national identity during a
lecture in which he characterized race as a “social construct.”150 Dugin has also called for the
end of “chauvinism, Eurocentrism, universalism, racism, [and] xenophobia…151 Despite his
protestations against racism, he nonetheless considers himself an ally to the New Right and
believes that the New Right à la Benoist is more or less consistent with his own fourth political
theory.152
Dugin’s declarations that race is an unimportant or even non-existent factor when
assessing identity has proven troublesome for many other New Rightists. For some this may
be linked in Dugin’s overt links to Traditionalism. It is of course true that Traditionalism and
Julius Evola have been an important intellectual inspiration for racist thinkers. The recently
deceased Jonathan Bowden, a self-described Nietzschean, in a talk hosted by members of the
New Right in London on June 5, 2010 lectured on the importance of Evola’s thought on the
contemporary New Right.153 Bowden argues that Evola and Tradition have been instrumental
in infusing the New Right with a spiritual and intellectual backbone that has allowed the New
Right to “ride the tiger” of modernity.154 However, Bowden warns that Traditionalism, placed
in the wrong hands, could lead to a dangerous “…sort of universalism at times or a neoliberalism occasionally where all cultures are of value, where all are ‘interesting,’ where all
are slightly interchangeable.”155 In other words, Bowden warns that Traditionalism has the
potential to be read as a pro-multicultural worldview. In a similar fashion, Guillame Faye, an
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avowed reader of Evola, also warned against Tradition. Faye urges caution against
“Evolianism,” which taken too far, “turns away from practical, tangible issues,” presumably
the Identitarian struggle.156
Various authors of the New Right have directly targeted Dugin as an enemy of the
movement over the subject of race. The online webzine Counter-Currents has been a gathering
place of mostly Anglophone New Rightists to publish articles about race, culture, politics, and
religion since 2010. Headed by its editor-in-chief, Greg Johnson, Counter-Currents describes
itself as having taken its intellectual cues from the anti-modernism of René Guénon and the
ethnic and racial nationalism of the European New Right. 157 Counter-Currents and similar
North American New Right metapolitical organs have provided mouthpieces to New Right
intellectuals who claim Dugin is not truly an ally of theirs or is at least only minimally
connected to the broader New Right ideology.
In the article “Dugin Contra Racism,” Giuliano Adriano Malvicini maintains that Dugin
is not a racist but a postmodern moral relativist. Malvicini complains that Dugin’s “incessant
denunciations of racism” are aimed purely at the West without regard to the racism present in
other parts of the world. 158 Additionally, Malvicini argues that Dugin’s arguments against
National Socialism in his The Fourth Political Theory are fundamentally flawed as he accepts
the dominant, and (Malvicini maintains) wrong, liberal narrative that German National
Socialism was fundamentally against other races. Absurdly, Malvicini says, National Socialism
was simply pro-German.159
Some New Rightists have changed their opinion of Dugin and his ideas over time. In
2004, Michael O’Meara described Dugin as a “Russian Identitarian” who shared the same
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worldview as himself.160 However, in an article written in 2013, O’Meara presents Dugin as a
thinker who is “difficult to pigeonhole” but nonetheless antithetical to the New Right project.
Despite the anti-egalitarianist and anti-materialist spirit of much of Dugin’s work, O’Meara is
completely against Dugin’s Eurasian geopolitical goals and what they seem to represent –
multi-culturualism. 161 O’Meara argues that, despite Dugin’s claims that a Eurasian empire
under Russia would protect the individual cultures of various ethnic groups, O’Meara contends
that this ethnopluralism would only lead to another, slightly more localized “anti-cultural” form
of multi-culturalism in which Jews, Muslims, Turks, Mongols, and Slavs would live
together. 162 Thus Dugin’s Eurasianist project is not unlike the communitarian concessions
made by Benoist over immigration. Indeed, O’Meara goes so far to argue that the likes of
Benoist and Dugin and their “miscegenating principles of global cosmopolitanism,” are
dangerous to both the New Right and Europe.163 According to thinkers like O’Meara, Dugin’s
Eurasianism “mixes white and yellow” and is anathema to any ethno-nationalist project.164
Greg Johnson has also come out to attack Alexander Dugin’s writings. Contrary to
many other New Rightists who hope for the economic as well as political unification into a
more or less federalized white Europe, Johnson anticipates that a victorious New Right will
oversee the creation of dozens of smaller states. These white ethno-states, determined by
plebiscite, would be based on ethnic, cultural, and religious factors.165 He describes Dugin’s
Neo-Eurasianist project as fundamentally against smaller, white, nationalities. Instead, Johnson
views it as more or less a ploy to resurrect the Soviet Union in territory, if not necessarily in its
constitutive spirit.166 Similarly, according to Johnson, Dugin’s call for multi-polarity is just
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another form of hegemony, leading, if successful, to the creation of a multi-racial empire that
is more concerned with state power than advancing ethnic, that is, white, concerns.
Although the New Right has not proposed a united, very specific geopolitical project,
some have suggested plans like that of Greg Johnson, in which Europeans and EuropeanAmericans form small, ethnically and culturally homogenous states that rely on the larger
countries such as France or the United Kingdom with nuclear deterrents to protect the smaller
white states. 167 Other, perhaps the majority, foresee the formation of a somewhat loosely
administered but united European empire. Guillaume Faye, for instance, calls for the formation
of an all-white empire of “Euro-Siberia” that would stretch from Iceland to Siberia.168 Yet
Alexander Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist project seems to fly in the face of these members of the
New Right. Contrary to any all-white supranational project proposed by other New Rightists,
Dugin’s Neo-Eurasian empire would include the direct annexation of Mongolia into Russia
proper. Furthermore, Eurasia’s expansion into northern and western China would certainly lead
to a larger non-European Chinese and Central Asian population within Russia. In addition, in
exchange for the territorial enlargement of Dugin’s Eurasia at the expense of China, China
would be granted suzerainty over the majority white country of Australia.169 Given Dugin’s
open discussion on how he envisions a Eurasian empire, it is not likely that he has the goal of
creating a racially homogenous community of nations in mind. Rather, it seems far more likely
that Dugin truly does not see biological race as a meaningful constitutive part of any form of
identity. Indeed, as this study has demonstrated, the overt lack of racism in Dugin’s thinking
has caused some within the New Right to question his presence in the movement altogether.
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Chapter 5: Dugin and Fascism

As this study has demonstrated, Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist project cannot be premised
upon a belief in biological race. Considering this, it is now important to investigate whether or
not Dugin can be considered a fascist. Fascism has long been a highly contested term and has
been the subject of much scholarly debate. Fascism is a disputed topic because unlike
communism or liberalism, which has had time to develop intellectual and theoretical backdrops
to their respective broad ideologies, fascism as a form of government existed in practice for a
very short period of time during the interwar years. Indeed, some would go so far as to say that
fascism, unlike liberalism or communism, inherently lacked any major essential intellectual
foundations as it was a fundamentally emotive and reactive political movement that
emphasized action over philosophy. Furthermore, many fascist experiments throughout the
history of the broad movement exhibited different tendencies. For instance, Nazi Germany
exhibited an extreme biological racism and anti-Semitism while Fascist Italy largely viewed
race, or la Razza, as a cultural rather than biological phenomenon and only belatedly and in
slavish emulation of Nazi Germany enacted anti-Semitic laws.170 Similarly, Nazi Germany was
perhaps the most “perfected” form of fascism in which traditional elites were almost
completely deposed and Nazism permeated almost all of German daily life. Conversely, Fascist
Italy was only partially successful in implementing a fascist program. Mussolini had to contend
not only with a sometimes recalcitrant Catholic Church but even with the persistence of the
Italian monarchy until Mussolini’s dismissal from office.
According to the historian Robert O. Paxton, fascism, unlike communism in which
internationalism is more or less a facet of its foundational philosophy, emphasizes a nation’s
“cultural particularism” which precludes it from a simple taxonomy.171 Some scholars, such as
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Zeev Sternhell, have essentially given up on using the term “fascism” outside of the context of
Mussolini’s Italy.172 For instance Sternhell contends that the centrality of biological racism in
National Socialism and the lack of it in Italian Fascism precludes them from being classified
as representatives of a generic fascism.173 Rather, would-be fascisms such as Romania’s Iron
Guard movement and the Spanish Falangists should be understood as unique phenomena unto
themselves. On the other hand, other scholars including Roger Griffin, Stanley G. Payne and
Robert O. Paxton hold that the problem of a generic fascist definition is not an insurmountable
one. They have attempted to establish a “fascist minimum,” a set of criteria that, if met by the
investigated political group, would allow scholars to identify them as a genuinely fascist
movement. Griffin has argued that a subject ideology meets the fascist minimum if it “…is a
political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of
populist ultra-nationalism.”174 In other words, an ideology can be considered fascist when it
combines a profound belief in the national need for a restoration of sacred values in order to be
born anew with an extreme, often messianic and expansionist, nationalism. For the purposes of
this study Griffin’s “fascist minimum” will be the means of measuring Neo-Eurasianism’s
fascist potential. However, prior to discussing Alexander Dugin’s possible fascism it is
essential to discuss more in depth the historiographical and scholarly debate surrounding
fascism in order to place Dugin’s body of thought within the broader context of the debate.
Marxist thought has contributed significantly to the debate over fascism. It is no surprise
that Marxist ideologues and scholars both have proposed an understanding of fascism that
emphasizes class warfare. Marxist historians such as Dave Renton have repeatedly criticized
other historians for their lack of emphasis of fascism’s fundamentally capitalist and anti-labor
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character. 175 Marxist historiography argues that fascist experiments such as in Italy and
Germany were in large part a violent reaction of capitalism against the proletariat in order to
preempt an increasingly possible communist revolution. 176 This is not to say that fascist
movements were necessarily created by the ruling capitalists. Yet, Marxists maintain, fascism
cannot come into power or remain in it without the support and funding of capitalists and big
businesses. Once in power, fascist movements largely act to the benefit of industrialists or
business owners by implementing reactionary laws aimed at restoring hierarchy, curtailing the
ability of workers to organize, and violently suppressing all those who oppose them. 177
In a similar vein, the historian Ernst Nolte, although not a Marxist, nonetheless came to the a
parallel conclusion to that of Marxists by arguing that Fascism represented not so much a
collection of positive ideas but a collection of negations the first two being anti-Marxism and
anti-materialism.178 According to Nolte, the Jews represented to Hitler and the Nazis a physical
manifestation of a “spirit of modernity” whose values including Marxism, consumerism, and
rationalism led to total cultural decadence and ennui.179 Thus the Holocaust enacted by the
Nazis represented a penultimate war against modernity and its values.
While Marxists and other scholars see a continuation of class warfare or violent antimodernism in historical fascism, others view it as a still more complicated phenomenon. The
historian Emilio Gentile argues that a fascist movement is constituted by a broader appeal to
not only anti-Marxism but also anti-capitalism and anti-modernism and its supporters have
historically come from throughout the economic spectrum. The following lists Gentile’s
understanding of what a fascist movement is:
1. a mass movement with multiclass membership in which prevail, among the leaders and
the militants, the middle sectors, in large part new to political activity, organized as a
party militia, that bases its identity not on social hierarchy or class origin but on a sense
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of comradeship, believes itself invested with a mission of national regeneration,
considers itself in a state of war against political adversaries and aims at conquering a
monopoly of political power by using terror, parliamentary politics, and deals with
leading groups, to create a new regime that destroys parliamentary democracy;
2. an 'anti-ideological' and pragmatic ideology that proclaims itself antimaterialist, antiindividualist, antiliberal, antidemocratic, anti-Marxist, is populist and anticapitalist in
tendency, expresses itself aesthetically more than theoretically by means of a new
political style and by myths, rites, and symbols as a lay religion designed to acculturate,
socialize, and integrate the faith of the masses with the goal of creating a 'new man';
3. a culture founded on mystical thought and the tragic and activist sense of life conceived
of as the manifestation of the will to power, on the myth of youth as artificer of history,
and on the exaltation of the militarization of politics as the model of life and collective
activity;
4. a totalitarian conception of the primacy of politics, conceived of as an integrating
experience to carry out the fusion of the individual and the masses in the organic and
mystical unity of the nation as an ethnic and moral community, adopting measures of
discrimination and persecution against those considered to be outside this community
either as enemies of the regime or members of races considered to be inferior or
otherwise dangerous for the integrity of the nation;
5. a civil ethic founded on total dedication to the national community, on discipline, virility,
comradeship, and the warrior spirit;
6. a single state party that has the task of providing for the armed defense of the regime,
selecting its directing cadres, and organizing the masses within the state in a process of
permanent mobilization of emotion and faith;
7. a police apparatus that prevents, controls, and represses dissidence and opposition, even
by using organized terror;
8. a political system organized by hierarchy of functions named from the top and crowned
by the figure of the 'leader,' invested with a sacred charisma, who commands, directs,
and coordinates the activities of the party and the regime;
9. corporative organization of the economy that suppresses trade union liberty, broadens
the sphere of state intervention, and seeks to achieve, by principles of technocracy and
solidarity, the collaboration of the 'productive sectors' under control of the regime, to
achieve its goals of power, yet preserving private property and class divisions;
10. a foreign policy inspired by the myth of national power and greatness, with the goal of
imperialist expansion.180

Thus Gentile outlines an understanding of fascism as a multi-faceted ideology that is typified
not just by a collection of shared negative values. For Gentile, fascism is also a series of positive
values including not only extreme nationalism and a vision of national rejuvenation but also a
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devotion to authoritarian or totalitarian hierarchy, the primacy of politics over economics and
the collective over the individual, as well as a cult of violence and militarism.
Gentile’s understanding of what constitutes a typical fascist state or ideology is one that
can generally be accepted by most scholars. However, a critical point of conflict in our
understanding of fascism is its stance on modernity. Just as fascists have historically
compromised with conservative elites, if sometimes only temporarily, so too have fascists
“compromised” with modernity. Stanley G. Payne’s outline of a definition of fascism
emphasizes the paradoxically modern and anti-modern nature of fascist ideologies:
“1. Ideology and Goals:
•

Espousal of an idealist, vitalist, and voluntaristic philosophy, normally involving the
attempt to realize a new modern, self-determined, and secular culture

•

Creation of a new nationalist authoritarian state not based on traditional principles or
models

•

Organization of a new highly regulated, multiclass, integrated national economic
structure, whether called national corporatist, national socialist, or national syndicalist

•

Positive evaluation and use of, or willingness to use violence and war

•

The goal of empire, expansion, or a radical change in the nation's relationship with
other powers

2. The Fascist Negations:
•

Antiliberalism

•

Anticommunism

•

Anticonservatism (though with the understanding that fascist groups were willing to
undertake temporary alliances with other sectors, more commonly with the right)

3. Style and Organization:

181

•

Attempted mass mobilization with militarization of political relationships and style and
with the goal of a mass single party militia

•

Emphasis on aesthetic structure of meetings, symbols, and political liturgy, stressing
emotional and mystical aspects

•

Extreme stress on the masculine principle and male dominance, while espousing a
strongly organic view of society

•

Exaltation of youth above other phases of life, emphasizing the conflict of the
generations, at least in effecting the initial political transformation

•

Specific tendency toward an authoritarian, charismatic, personal style of command,
whether or not the command is to some degree initially elective.”181
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Payne argues that fascism, while rejecting many modern values such as materialism,
rationalism, the primacy of economics in understanding human relations, and human rights,
nonetheless demonstrates its own modern nature through secularization, the displacement of
traditional elites, populism, and the further bureaucratization of the state. Indeed, other scholars
have pointed out the modern nature of fascism in not only its administrative actions but also in
its aesthetics and worldview. While despairing of contemporary bourgeois values, fascists
rarely took inspiration from idealized values within the past. Rather, fascists often attempted
to create a new, modern value system that highlighted the powerful and violent capabilities of
modern technology and the efficiency of industry.182 For instance, in Italy Tommaso Emilio
Marinetti an early supporter of Fascism, called for a rejection of what he saw of bourgeois
decadence and prudery. In its place, Marinetti envisioned a new, palingenetic society in which
technology facilitated the growth a militant and zealous cult of the nation.183 Akin to Marinetti,
Ernst Jünger called for the creation of a modern “warrior-worker.”184 This new class of man
would zealously work toward an advanced industrial society which would be totally mobilized
towards the needs of the nation and willing to fight at a moment’s notice.
In summation, we can understand a movement or ideology to be fascist at the bare
minimum when a palingenetic ideology of national rebirth meets ultranationalism. We can also
distill other scholars’ interpretations of fascism to generalize that typical forms of fascism have
often displayed a zealous militarism, expansionism, populism, authoritarianism and modernism
while maintaining a hostility towards liberalism, Marxism, rationalism, and bourgeois values.
At the same time however, fascism, while calling for a rebirth of the nation, often envisions a
completely new nation rather than a restored idealized past. Thus fascist states tend to
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emphasize a new modern aesthetic of technology, efficiency, apocalyptic violence and a new
hierarchy that is ultimately largely disdainful of tradition.
Robert Paxton has raised the important point that fascist ideological programs, insofar
as they had ones, prior to coming to power did not always coincide with their policies once
they did come to power.185 It would be, for example, a problematic methodology to attempt to
understand Nazism largely through reading the early Nazi speeches, particularly of the Strasser
brothers. 186 Yet Dugin is not in power, nor does Vladimir Putin openly support Dugin’s
worldview. Thus in ascertaining whether or not Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism meets a fascist
minimum his body of written ideas are largely the only sources on which to draw from.
It is initially self-evident that Alexander Dugin’s body of thought certainly represents,
in the least, fascistic tendencies. After all Dugin is a vehement opponent of liberalism,
egalitarianism and consumerism. He has repeatedly supported Vladimir Putin and his
repressive tactics in the hopes that Putin will lay the foundation for an internationally resurgent
Russia. It has also been thoroughly demonstrated that Dugin is anything but a pacifist and is
very willing to engage in war, particularly with the United States, if it leads to the formation of
a Eurasian empire. Dugin’s plans for imperial expansion positively dwarf even the most
ambitious plans of Nazi expansion and Lebensraum. Indeed, Dugin’s hatred of what he sees as
the morally decaying effects of American hegemony matches closely with Nazism’s obsessive
hatred of Jews and their paranoia over Jewish and Bolshevik infiltration.
Yet in applying Griffin’s fascist minimum to Dugin’s case it can only be concluded that
Neo-Eurasianism, while certainly sharing many traits with historical cases of fascism, is not
necessarily a fascist doctrine. As this work has demonstrated, Dugin, like many fascists, yearns
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for a complete reconstruction of state, culture and society. However, while fascism has
ultimately emphasized a fundamentally alternative modern vision of a new state, Dugin’s
worldview, characterized as it is by Evola and Tradition, is utterly anti-modern. Fascist Italy
and Nazi Germany were both characterized by a fondness for industry, efficiency and
bureaucracy. The reigning aesthetic was one that emphasized youth, vigor, productivity and
technological progress. Conversely, Dugin is deeply ambivalent toward any narrative of
progress and even modern technology.
In his The Fourth Political Theory Dugin describes an isolated community of Old
Believers who live in the Ural Mountains. Here, these “fundamental conservatives” avoid
seemingly trivial affectations such as wearing plaid.187 In addition, they only use torches and
candles for lighting for electrical lighting is “’the light of Lucifer.’”188 They also scorn the
eating of boiled buckwheat or the drinking of tea and coffee as “’sinful.’”189 Dugin urges the
reader not to consider these practices outdated or odd, but rather understand that their
antagonism toward modern values is so complete that they will also spurn the use of
modernity’s concomitant technological marvels. For these Old Believers rightly see that
“…time is regress, and modern men are a sacrificial offering to the devil.”190 For Dugin, then,
it is completely acceptable and even desirable to not only reject modernity and any narrative
of progress but to even participate in traditionalist religious communities that enforce this
worldview. Dugin’s anti-modernism is anathema to fascism’s vitalist cult of technology and
action which, while against certain aspects of modernity such as what they would describe as
consumerism, hedonism and individualism, nonetheless allowed for an alternative vision of
modernity which allowed technological and social innovation. On the contrary, Dugin’s antimodernism seems to be a holistic critique of any form of modernism that allows for any
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narrative of progress, social and/or technological, that would lead man further away from
Tradition. Thus while both fascism and Neo-Eurasianism can be said to be palingenetic, the
former desires an alternative modernity, while the latter completely rejects modernity in all its
forms.
In regards to the second criteria of Griffin’s fascist minimum, ultranationalism, Dugin’s
approach to nation is complex. As has been demonstrated, Dugin clearly desires Russia to
create a massive empire that would exceed the territorial extent of the Soviet Union. However,
just as Traditionalism has colored Dugin’s understanding of modernity, so too has it influenced
his understanding of nation. While Italian fascism viewed la Razza in largely cultural terms,
Italian Fascism nonetheless took for granted the fact that Italians were to be the main
beneficiaries of a fascist state. Indeed, while Italian Fascism was not explicitly racist in its
doctrine, this did not stop Fascist Italy from deporting Slovenes to a concentration camp on the
island of Rab nor exacting even harsher revenge against recalcitrant African natives.191 Even
more explicitly than fascism in Italy, German National Socialism viewed the welfare of the
German nation as the penultimate goal to strive toward. No other nation, particularly Jews,
were permitted to block Germany’s national destiny to become a continental hegemon. In short,
fascist thought argues that one’s nation and the state ruling and administering that nation
represent the highest value.
In opposition, Dugin proposes an understanding of the Russian nation that allows for
its importance but only insofar as it is a spiritual liberator of Eurasia and the fomenter of a
greater identity. Indeed, like the European New Right which proposes a new, supranational
model of identity that transcends any extreme pride in a single nation, Neo-Eurasianism calls
for the formation of a new geopolitical entity and identity. Concomitantly, Dugin’s proposed
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neo-Eurasian identity is one based on spirituality and Traditional thought. Dugin sees the
Russian nation as a potential spark to unite Eurasian civilization into a greater empire that, after
defeating the United States, will then attempt to return to Traditional hierarchy and value
systems. For Dugin Traditional spirituality is the highest value. Given this, it is impossible to
define Dugin as an ultranationalist like historical fascists.
In conclusion, Dugin does not wholly meet the criteria of a fascist minimum. This is
not to say that Neo-Eurasianism represents any less of a dangerous ideology to international
peace or liberal democracy. Dugin’s philosophy certainly shares the “fascist negations” that
include anti-egalitarianism, anti-democracy and anti-liberalism. Neo-Eurasianism also shares
a similar palingenetic worldview to that of fascist movements. However, while fascism’s
national rebirth is an alternative form of modernity that emphasizes some aspects of modernity
and discards others, Dugin’s anti-modernity is profoundly reactionary. Correspondingly, while
a central tenet of fascism is ultranationalism and extreme pride in a single nation, Dugin
proposes a supranational project that would place the Russian nation along with numerous other
peoples in a larger empire. Russia, in short, is an important facet of Dugin’s project, but it is
not an end in itself.
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Conclusion

As recently as October, 2014, Alexander Dugin was scheduled to participate in a
conference in Budapest, Hungary hosted by the National Policy Institute, an American New
Right think tank. Here Dugin, along with Greg Johnson and others of the New Right were
planning on delivering talks and lectures on the state of the movement. However, in late
September, the Hungarian government banned the conference from taking place.192 In response,
Alexander Dugin instead posted a Youtube video of the lecture that he would have given, had
the conference taken place. In the video, Dugin rehashes much of what he has already
articulated in his theoretical works on the Fourth Political Theory. He argues that the New Right
must reject all forms of racism, which he argues is an Anglo-Saxon creation and includes
biological racism, eurocentrism and the “racist” universality of liberalism and Marxism. At the
same time he maintained that there is not one universal humanity but a collection of various
humanities defined by “civilization.” 193 Thus Europe and Eurasia, based on different
civilizational models, should remain allies to fight against their common enemy, the United
States’ global hegemony, but should respect one another’s civilizational differences. Thus
Dugin signaled once again that a collective civilizational and Traditional mythomoteur
animates and gives meaning to national and supranational identities, not biological race or
ethnicity.
Given his repeated declarations of anti-racism and a disbelief in biological race, it is
curious that he seems to remain an accepted member of the New Right despite an increasing
number of protests against him within the ranks. Part of this can be explained by the fact that,
even if Dugin is not a racist, as many are now realizing, he still represents a popular anti-liberal
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academic within Russia whose views nonetheless share an anti-egalitarianism and antiAmericanism similar to that of the rest of the New Right. Concomitantly, a Eurasianist Russia,
even if not sharing the biological racism shared by many within the New Right, would
nonetheless constitute a powerful enemy against American global power.
It goes without saying that regardless of Dugin’s stance on race, Neo-Eurasianism is a
genuinely dangerous doctrine to world peace and is a threat to international stability. In
February, 2014 Kiev, the capital city of Ukraine, was rocked by a series of increasingly violent
clashes between protesters and government forces. The source of the conflict was over the
refusal of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych to sign a trade agreement with the European
Union that would see Ukraine tied closer economically to Europe and decrease Russian
economic influence in Ukraine. Instead, in December 2013 Yanukovych elected to sign a trade
agreement with Russia, which included cheap natural gas from the Russian Federation to
Ukraine in exchange for providing the Russian navy with warm water ports along the Kerch
peninsula.194 Almost immediately pro-western Kievans began a series of protests against their
government's decision. The protests, initially peaceful, quickly became violent as police forces
sought to quell the unrest. With no end in sight to the rising tensions and violence, Yanukovych
fled the country and a new interim government took control of the Ukrainian state. With the
fall of the pro-Russian Ukrainian government and with the support of Putin's Russia, ethnically
Russian areas of Ukraine, notably the Crimean peninsula and eastern parts of the country began
violently agitating for independence. As we speak, there continues to be something akin to a
civil war developing within Ukraine. The Crimean peninsula has been successfully annexed
into the Russian Federation and areas with many ethnic Russians have been equipped and
sometimes supported by Russian troops.
Despite President Vladimir Putin's repeated declarations that the Russian Federation
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does not desire to get involved in a foreign country's internal affairs, it is an open secret that
Russian troops have armed separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that have seized
parts of Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, Russian ultranationalists such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky have
openly called for even further encroachments upon Ukrainian sovereignty. Indeed,
Zhirninovsky has gone so far as to threaten the “destruction” of Poland and the Baltic states if
the United States and the rest of the West retaliated against Russia’s intervention in Ukraine.195
Like Zhirinovsky, many nationalists view Ukraine, or at least significant parts of its territory,
as part of Russia's legitimate territory. The foundation of a Ukrainian state in the aftermath of
the breakup of the Soviet Union constituted a defeat for the Russian nation and a victory for
the West, an eternal enemy in much of Russian nationalist discourse. Ukraine's loss is just one
of many injustices that contemporary Russian nationalists hope to redress in their lifetimes – a
hope that they have placed in the person of Vladimir Putin.
For the likes of the Russian philosopher and radical rightist Alexander Dugin, a
successful outcome for Russia in Ukraine is hopefully just a small segment of a much larger
geopolitical project. While Neo-Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory remain largely a
part of fringe political discourse, it is not impossible that it will not gain traction with both
elites and common Russian citizens in the future. As it stands, Dugin himself has remained
ambivalent on measuring the amount of real impact his ideas have had on Russian politics. On
one hand he has proudly pointed out the fact that his Foundations of Geopolitics remains a
popular book for many Russian officers and policy makers. Dugin has gone so far to contend
that his ideas have influenced Vladimir Putin.196 On the other hand, he has also claimed that
Putin is ultimately a political pragmatist and has little time for ideology.197 Thus, while Dugin
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has repeatedly argued that Putin stands the best chance of successfully countering global
American hegemony and creating a greater Russian empire, he also worries that Putin’s
pragmatism and lack of philosophical convictions will only lead Russia towards a slow but
definite slide into liberal democracy.198 Given that Dugin’s geopolitical and illiberal worldview
virtually demands a global war against the United States and its allies, one can only hope that
Dugin’s fears come true.
This study has argued against interpreting Alexander Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism as a
more or less ethnic or racist, fascist blueprint. Despite his membership within the New Right it
is important to note that even its founder, Alain de Benoist, has come under attack for doctrinal
impurities when it came to discussions of race and “white survival.” One of the major problems
with contemporary academic discussion of Dugin and the New Right is a tendency to
characterize the project as something of a monolith rather than a deeply fragmented
conglomeration of similar yet competing sub-ideologies. Dugin shares the anti-Americanism,
anti-democratic and anti-liberal tendencies of the New Right. He, along with the New Right,
are intellectual heirs of Traditional thought and the Conservative Revolution to one degree or
another. Yet Dugin has repeatedly articulated a fundamentally different view of identity than
the New Right and fascism.
Dugin has offered many protestations against biological racism. His geopolitical visions
seem to discount race or ethnicity and elevate cultural, historical and spiritual factors in his
Eurasian project. Furthermore he has espoused a Traditional worldview that discounts
biological race. Dugin’s worldview is colored by something else. His ideology is not grounded
upon racial or ethnic notions of identity, despite his fascistic leanings. Rather, Dugin’s ideology
is grounded in the esoteric belief in a Perennial Tradition of which Orthodox Christianity and
other Eurasian traditional religions represent facets of a single divine truth. Combining a myth-
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symbol complex utilizing a mixture of Traditionalist belief in Russia’s messianic need to unify
and protect other peoples with Orthodoxy and a reverence for Russia’s simpler past, Dugin has
created a mythomoteur that constitutes a new identity for the Russian nation; that of the
divinely-inspired unifying force to bring Russia and the rest of the world not to Orthodoxy, but
to the Perennial Tradition.
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Glossary

Ariosophy – Also known as Armanism, Ariosophy is a term used to describe the racist
and esoteric writings of mystics such as Guido von List (1848 – 1919) and Jorg Lanz von
Liebensfels (1874 – 1954). Ariosophy can be understood as a broad philosophy that maintained
that Aryans, or Nordic peoples, are scientifically and/or spiritually superior beings to nonAryans, particularly Jews. Ariosophy maintained that Aryan man originated in a fantastical
northern continent known sometimes as Atlantis, Hyperborea or Thule. Organizing themselves
in small lodges in Austria during the late nineteenth century and continuing into the interwar
years, Ariosophists were fascinated with Germanic paganism and runes, seeing in the ancient
practices of their Germanic ancestors a means of revitalizing modern Aryans. Ariosophy has
been likened to a proto-Nazi ideology as its esoteric and mystical understanding of history
combined to color much of the symbolism and eugenics policies of Nazism.
Conservative Revolution – The Conservative Revolution was a dissident rightist
intellectual movement that originated during the Weimar Republic. While opposed to what it
saw as the moral decadence of modern bourgeois values and the rising communist tide as the
Nazis, Conservative Revolutionary thinkers such as Oswald Spengler (1880 – 1936) and Arthur
Moeller van den Bruck (1876 – 1925) were also skeptical of the populism and demagoguery
present in Nazism and other fascist movements. Conservative Revolutionaries tended to argue
for a “Prussian” socialism in which traditional elites were restored but the nation would be
united under an authoritarian ruler through revolutionary means. Unlike National Socialism,
the Conservative Revolution espoused a cultural rather than biological anti-Semitism and a
deep distrust of what they considered to be vulgar mass politics.
Fascism – A radical and extreme political ideology that combines a belief in the need
for national rebirth, a renewal of cultural values and fervent ultranationalism. Typified by Nazi
Germany and Fascist Italy, fascist movements have historically emphasized a vehement disdain
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for liberalism, Marxism, materialism, modernity and traditional elites. At the same time,
fascism has often represented a modern reaction to modernity by further centralizing the state,
displacing

traditional

elites,

secularizing

politics

and

culture,

and

introducing

(pseudo-)scientific understandings of race.
Identitarianism – is a philosophical understanding of reality that holds that cultural
and/or racial identity and its preservation are of the utmost importance. Originating in Cold
War Europe, the term has become synonymous with the ideas espoused by Alain de Benoist
and other members of the European New Right.
Modernity – For the purposes of this work, modernity is defined as the cultural and
social value system that has existed since the advent of the Enlightenment in the Western World.
These values include rationalism over mysticism, science and materialism over spirituality,
economics over politics, and the importance of individual identity over organic communities.
These values have become antithetical to New Right thinkers such as Alain de Benoist,
Alexander Dugin and others who see modernity not as a positive, progressive step towards
something better but a backwards slide into hedonist consumerism.
Mythomoteur – a term coined by the political scientist Anthony D. Smith, a
mythomoteur is the constitutive complex of myths and symbols that create meaningful and
lasting national identities. These myths, real or imagined, are utilized to fashion a multitude of
local and regional identities into a larger national identity by linking the disparate regions
through a shared history and images.
Particularism – a term often utilized by Alexander Dugin and like-minded thinkers
who argue that the United States and its alleged global military-cultural hegemony threatens
the individuality of various particular cultures and peoples. Particularism, then, is a call to
preserve the individual characteristics of culturally distinct peoples, small and large, against
what is considered to be the homogenizing effects of modern American consumerist and
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decadent culture.
Perennial Tradition – The Perennial Tradition, also known as Guénonian
Traditionalism or simply Traditionalism, is the esoteric religious belief that virtually all the
world’s religions were once combined into a universal divine truth. This truth was encapsulated
in a divinely-ordained human hierarchy in which the priest-king acted as a natural intercessor
between inferior castes and the divine. However, with time and especially with the advent of
modernity, sacred traditional values and practices such as traditional hierarchy and gender roles
were inverted thus leading man only further away from the divine. Popularized by the mysticscholars René Guénon (1886 – 1951) and Julius Evola (1898 – 1974), Traditionalism is a
pessimistic anti-modern (see: modernity) worldview that holds that Western society is in
spiritual and moral decline. Traditionalism maintains that only through initiation in one of the
religious paths that still have some connection to the primordial divine, such as Hinduism or a
form of paganism, or through radical political, social and cultural reconstruction can man be
reconnected with the natural, divinely-ordained order. Today, Alexander Dugin is perhaps one
of the most known practitioners of Traditionalism.
Sacred Geography – A belief in the sacral nature of geographical space is present
within the writings of both Ariosophists and Traditionalists. For instance, both Ariosophy and
Tradition argue that during some primordial past a group of pure beings who held sacred
wisdom lived in a far northern continent and later travelled and settled throughout the rest of
the planet. However, unlike Ariosophists who claim that these settlers were racially and
genetically superior Aryans, Traditionalists maintain that these beings were simply spiritually
superior due to their advanced knowledge of the natural and divinely-ordained hierarchy that
they then bestowed to the rest of humanity. The similarities between Ariosophist and
Traditionalist definitions of sacred geography have led some scholars to conflate the two.
White Nationalism – A nationalist project that wishes to see the creation of either a
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large empire or collection of small states based on the premise that all racially white, or native
European, peoples should live together. This term has frequently been utilized by White Power
terrorists such as members of the violent group The Order as well as right wing thinkers such
as Greg Johnson.
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